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Tothe theologian, money is the "root of all
evil." To the economist, money had hardly less
importance up to the early 1930's. It was then
widely accepted that long-period changes in
the quantity of money were the primary source
of trends in the level of prices and that short-
period fluctuations in the quantity of money
P A R T II played an important role in business cycles
and might be the major explanation of them.
For example, in his monumental book on
Reportson businesscycles published in 1913, Wesley C.
Mitchell, while by no means promulgating or
Selected acceptingan exclusively monetary theory of the
cycle, gave much attention to monetary factors,
Bureau
constructingnew estimates of various monetary
components which are still part of the statisti-
cal underpinning of our present series on the Programs stockof money.
The Keynesian revolutionineconomic
thought in the mid-1930's produced a radical
change in the attention paid by economists to
money. The fact that the Federal. Reserve
System did not stem the Great Depression was
interpreted as meaning that money was of
secondary importance, at most a reflection of
changes occurring elsewhere. Though this con-
clusion was a non sequitur, it was nonetheless
potent. And it was all the more readily ac-
cepted because Keynes provided an intellec-
tually appealing alternative explanation of the
Great Depression. For nearly two decades
thereafter, money became a minor matter in
most academic economic writing and research,
to be mentioned almost as an afterthought.
And economic research on money was notable
by its absence.
Recently there has been a revival of interest
in money and a great increase in the amount
7of economic research on money. Several causes
combined to produce this revival of interest.
One was dissatisfaction with the predictions
yielded by the Keynesian analysis—the most
dramatic being the failure of the much-pre-
dicted postwar depression to occur. A second
was the emergence of inflation as a major
problem in all countries that adopted the easy-
money policy, widely regarded as called for
by the Keynesian analysis. No country suc-
ceeded in stemming inflation until it replaced
the easy-money policy by more "orthodox"
monetary measures. A third was scholarly
criticism and analysis of Keynes' theoretical
structure, and the resulting attribution of an
important theoretical roleto the so-called
"real-balance" effect. A fourth was the accu-
mulation of empirical evidence bearing on the
behavior of money and its relation to other
economic magnitudes. The combined effect
has been striking. Ten years ago, we at the
National Bureau and an associated group at
the University of Chicago were almost the
only academic economists working iiflensively
on money. Today, I am glad to say, we have
a host of competitors.
1. THE STUDIES COVERED BY
THIS REPORT
The National Bureau's monetary research has
throughout been closely connected with its
studies of business cycles. Wesley Mitchell's
preliminary manuscript on business cycles con-
tained a long chapter on the role of money
and credit in the cycle. For that chapter, he
had collected many series bearing on money
and credit, which remain the backbone of
the Bureau's collection of series in this area.
The chapter was the starting point of• the
studies covered by this report, as other chap-
ters were of so many of the major National
Bureau studies.
This report covers only those monetary
studies of the Bureau for which Anna J.
Schwartz, Phillip Cagan, and I have had re-
-sponsibility.The group of studies, begun well
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over a decade ago, is now, I am glad to report,
nearly completed. Hence, this report deals
mostly with work already done or nearly done.
Needless to say, just as our studies built on
the earlier work of the Bureau and other inves-
tigators, so, I trust, they will in their turn open
up new avenues of future research for the
Bureau and for others. The test of success in
any scientific research is dual: the questions
it answers and, even more, the new questions
it raises. Though I shall refer incidentally to
some of the questions our work raises and on
which further research is needed, I shall not
attempt a comprehensive survey. Research
.must lead its own life. I am all too aware
how much our own work departed from the
lines we initially expected it to follow to want
to peer too deeply into that clouded (and
crowded) crystal ball.
As our work proceeded, we came to plan
three monographs. One, A Monetary History
of the United States, 1867-1960, by Anna J.
Schwartz and myself, was published in 1963.
A second,"Determinants andEffectsof
Changes in the Money Stock, 1875-1955," by
Philip Cagan, will soon go to press. The third,
"Trends and Cycles in the Stock of Money in
the United States," by Anna Schwartz and my-
self, is in first draft form. The major unfinished
work is the substantial revision and expansion
of the present draft, which was completed years
ago and then put aside while we finished the
Monetary History. We hope that by the next
annual meeting we can report that this mono-
graph too is ready or nearly ready for review
by the Board of Directors.
In addition, four other Bureau publications
have come from our studies. "Money and
Business Cycles," by Friedman and Schwartz
(Conference on the State of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Review of Economics and Statistics,
Feb. 1963 suppi.), is something of a preview
and advance summary of one part of our pro-
jected volume, "Trends and Cycles." Friedman,
The Demand for Money (O.P. 68, 1959), is a
preliminary version of another chapter of that
work, and Friedman, The Interpolation of
Time Series by Related Series (T.P. 16, 1962),
is a by-product of our monetary estimates.Phillip Cagan's The Demand for Currency
Relative to Total Money Supply (O.P. 62,
1958) is a preliminary version of part of his
monograph.
2. THE MEANING OF "MONEY"
AND OUR ESTIMATES OF THE
QUANTITY OF MONEY
It will help put our work in proper perspective
to distinguish at the outset between different
senses in which the word "money" is used.
In popular parlance, there are three main
senses—as in pocket money, money market,
and making money. In the first sense money
refers to a class of assets of wealthholders; in
the second, to credit; in the third, to income.
Our work has been concerned with money
in the first sense. We have of course had to
consider both credit conditions and income:
credit conditions as affecting the quantity of
money, as being in turn affected by changes
in the quantity of money, and as one of
the channels through which changes in the
quantity of money may affect income; simi-
larly, income as perhaps the centraltotal
whose fluctuations constitute business cycles,
as a source of changes in the quantity of
money, and as itself affected by changes in the
quantity of money. We have repeatedly been
impressed in the course of our work with the
importance of clearly distinguishing between
money as an asset—as a stock at a point in
time—and these other phenomena for which
the word money is frequently used. Indeed,
a key finding in our Monetary History is that
the confusion of money and credit has been a
primary source of difficulty in monetary policy.
And recent experience indicates this is still so.
Credit conditions are affected by a much
broader range of factors than those linked to
the quantity of money and they require study
in their own right. This is being done in the
National Bureau studies of consumer credit,
interest rates, and the quality of credit.
Our emphasis on money as an asset led
us to take as our first major project the con-
struction of a consistent and continuous set
of estimates on the quantity of money for as
long a period as possible. This turned out to
be a more arduous task than anticipated, in-
volving as it did piecing together numerous
bits of data from a wide variety of sources.
The final series starts in 1867, is for semi-
annual or annual dates to 1907, and monthly
thereafter. Though the series is now available
(in an appendix to A Monetary History) ,a
full description of sources and methods, and
supplementary tables giving various compo-
nents of the series and related series, are yet
to be published. They will be included in our
planned volume, "Trends and Cycles."
These estimates, as well as our subsequent
work, brought to the fore the more specific
question of precisely how to define money.
Should it include only literal pocket money—
that is, paper currency and coin? Or also de-
mand deposits subject to transfer by check?
Commercial bank time deposits? Mutual sav-
ings bank deposits? Savings and loan shares?
Cash surrender values of life insurance poli-
cies? Series E bonds? And so on toward the
outer bound defined by some of the broad
concepts of liquidity; or, in a different and
appealing direction, toward weighted
aggregates of the several elements.
Our statistical estimates, so far as feasible,
give the components separately, so that each
user can make his own choice within the limits
of what we could estimate. In our work, we
have generally found that the most useful single
total is an intermediate one—currency held
by the public, plus demand deposits adjusted
of commercial banks, plus time deposits of
commercial banks. Hence, we have termed this
total "money" for our purposes and have used
other expressions for other totals. The forth-
coming volume on trends and cycles will dis-
cuss the question of in some detail
and present the empirical evidence which led
us to adopt this particular definition. So far
as I can see, no issue of principle is involved
in the choice of definition, but only a question
of the empirical usefulness of one or another
admittedly imperfect approximation to a the-
oretical construct. So far. as I can see, no
.9importantsubstantiveissuesareinvolved
either. Judged by the criteria we used, alterna-
tive definitions are not much inferior to the
one we adopted, so that a strong case against
them cannot be made. Whenever possible, we
have tried systematically to see whether any
substantive conclusion is affected by substitut-
ing an alternative concept. Typically, none is,
though some of the numerical relations may
be different for one concept than for another.
The occasional impression in the scientific
literature that important substantive issues are
involved generally turns out to be a result of
the use of the word money to refer to different
things.
All of our studies have been heavily de-
pendent on the new estimates of the quantity
of money we constructed. Our Monetary His-
tory "traces the changes in the stock of money
•.. examinesthe factors that accounted for
the changes, and analyzes the reflex influence
that the stock of money exerted on the course
of events." In his monograph Cagan examines
intensively the sources of changes in the stock
of money and gives a detailed statistical analy-
sis of the cyclical and secular behavior of each
of the proximate determinants of the quantity
of money, as we term them: high-powered
money, the ratio of deposits at banks to their
reserves, and the ratio of the public's holdings
of deposits to its holdings of currency. The
"Trends and Cycles" volume will, besides giv-
ing the basis for our new estimates, present a
full statistical analysis of the secular and cycli-
cal behavior of the stock of money and of
monetary velocity in relation to other economic
magnitudes. We shall rely heavily on the stand-
ard Bureau techniques to determine charac-
teristic cyclical amplitude and timing. We plan
also to supplement these techniques with both
correlation techniques and—hopefully—-spec-
tral analysis, to see whether different tech-
niques give consistent results.
The major scientificcontribution of the
studies probably will prove to be their quanti-
tative findings about a host of specific mag-
'A Monetary History, p.3.
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nitudes and relations. Most of our findings to
date are summarized in the final chapter of
A Monetary History, in the final chapter of
Cagan's monograph, and in "Money and Busi-
ness Cycles." They constitute building blocks
to be incorporated in that general theory of the
cycle which is the ultimate aim of scholars in
the field.
Rather than try to summarize those findings
here again, I should like instead to give some-
thing of the flavor of our work by considering
an important specific issue, outlining the kind
of evidence that is available from our published
work on it, and giving some additional evidence
from our unpublished work. I shall then sum-
marize the general qualitative conclusions we
have reached, with special stress on their limi-
tations, and, finally, illustrate the applicability
of some of our results to the interpretation of
recent economic changes.
3. THE DIRECTION OF
INFLUENCE BETWEEN MONEY
AND BUSINESS
The specific issue I propose to consider is in
some ways the central issue in dispute about
the role of money in business cycles, namely,
whether the cyclical behavior of money is to
be regarded as a major factor explaining busi-
ness fluctuations or as simply a reflection of
business fluctuations produced by other forces.
In Irving Fisher's words, the issue is whether
the cycle is largely a "dance of the dollar" or,
conversely, the dollar is largely a dance of
the cycle. Stated still differently, the issue is
whether the major direction of influence is
from money to business or from business to
money.
In each of these statements of the issue,
I have used an adjective like "major" or
"largely." One reason is that the alternatives
contrasted are not mutually exclusive. Un-
doubtedly there can be and are influences run-
fling both ways. Indeed, insofar as the cycle
is in any measure self-generating and not sim-
ply a response to external shocks, and insofaras. money plays any systematic role in produc-
in,g the cycle, the influences must run both
ways, the changes in the stock of money pro-
ducing changesinbusinessthat. produce
changes in the stock of money that continue
the cycle.
A second reason for the qualifying words
is that there can be and almost certainly are
factors other than money that contribute to
the cycle, whatever may be the role of money.
The question at issue is, therefore, whether
money exerts an important independent influ-
ence, not whether it is the only source of busi-
ness fluctuations and itself wholly independent
of them.




Perhaps the most directly relevant kind of evi-
dence emerges from an examination of the
historical circumstances surrounding changes
in the quantity of money. They often have
decisive bearing on whether the changes could
have been an immediate or necessary conse-
quence of contemporary changes in business
conditions. Thisisparticularly true about
policy changes deliberately instituted by mone-
tary authorities, which is why, as we say in
A Monetary History, "the establishment of
the Federal Reserve System provides the stu-
dent of money a closer substitute for the con-
trolled experiment to determine the direction
of influence than the social scientist can gen-
erally obtain."2
From such evidence, it is possible to iden-
tify a number of occasions on which monetary
changes have clearly been independent of
contemporaneous changes in business condi-
tions. On thoseoccasions,the monetary
changes have been accompanied by economic
changes in the same direction, monetary con-
tractions (or more precisely, reductions in the
rate of change in the stock of money) being
accompanied by contractions in money income,
Monetary History, p. 687.
prices, and output; arid monetary expansions,
by the opposite. The relation between mone-
tary and economic change at those times also
has been very much the same as on other occa-
sions when historical circumstances were less
decisive about the source of the monetary
change. We ended our summary of this evidence
in the final chapter of A Monetary History as
follows: "Mutual interaction, but with money
rather clearly the senior partner in longer-run
movements and in major cyclical movements,
and more nearly an equal partner with money
income and prices in shorter-run and milder
movements—this isthe generalization sug-
gested by our evidence."
(2) THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF THE MONEY STOCK
In his monograph, Cagan provides a rather
different kind of evidence. Any change in the
money stock can be attributed to changes in
the three proximate determinants, mentioned
earlier:high-powered money, thedeposit-
reserve ratio, and the deposit-currency ratio.
Any influence of business conditions on money
must operate through one or more of these
determinants. If this is the major direction of
influence, the determinants separately should
be more closely related to business conditions
than the money stock as a whole is; moreover,
the observed relation should be consistent with
what we know about the character of the mone-
taryinstitutions regardedas producingit.
Hence, examination of the relation of money
and each determinant separately to business
conditions provides evidence on the direction
of influence.
For secular movements, Cagan finds that
high-powered money. is the major source of
changes iñ the stock of money. During most
of the period studied, increases in prices would
be expected to have reduced the quantity of
high-powered money by discouraging gold out-
put and encouraging gold exports. Conversely,
decreases in prices would have encouraged
gold output and stimulated gold inflows. Yet
the actual relation isthe other way: price
increases are associated with a higher than
11average rate of rise in high-powered money;
price decreases, with a lower than average rate
of rise. Moreover, there is a closer relation
between income and changes in the total money
stock than between income and the separate
determinants. Cagan concludes that, for secu-
lar movements, the predominant direction of
influence must run from money to income.
"To explain secular movements in prices," he
writes, "we should look primarily to the supply
of money and then secondarily to nonmonetary
factors that may also have been important."
For cyclical fluctuations, Cagan finds the
evidence more mixed. Itis clearest for the
severe business contractions. For these, he
does not find it possible to attribute the changes
in the stock of money to the effect of business
on the determinants of the stock of money.
Hence, the uniform coincidence of severe mone-
tary contraction and severe economic contrac-
tion seems persuasive evidence for an influence
running from money to business. As Cagan
writes, "a monetary explanation of why some
business contractions become severe, whatever
may have started them, is hardly novel, but
the supporting evidence is much stronger than
is generally recognized." Incidentally, this ex-
planation of severe business contractions is
not necessarily inconsistent with an alternative
explanation suggested by Moses Abramovitz
in his work on long cycles. The relation be-
tween the two explanations will be examined
in our "Trends and Cycles" volume.
For business cycles not containing severe
contractions, Cagan finds clear evidence of the
influence of business on money operating
through the determinants. The deposit-cur-
rency ratio was the most important single
source of cyclical fluctuations in the rate of
change in the money stock. Cagan attributes
most of the fluctuations in the deposit-currency
ratio to the effect of the contemporaneous
cyclical movements in economic activity. Sim-
ilarly, he regards the fluctuations in the reserve
ratio as reflecting cyclical movements in credit
demands. For mild cycles, there is therefore
clear evidence of a feedback effect of business
on money. But Cagan also finds evidence of
the same kind of effect of money on business
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which is so clearly present in secular move-
ments and severe contractions. That evidence
is the fact that the relation between money and
business during mild cycles remains the same
over a long period despite substantial changes
in the institutional structure connecting busi-
ness and the separate determinants.
(3) CONSISTENCY OF TIMING ON PosiTivE
AND INVERTED BASIS
A third type of evidence is provided by the
cyclical timing of monetary changes. However,
to explain the relevance of this evidence, I
shall have to digress briefly to describe our
measures of the cyclical timing of money.
In studying the cyclical timing of money,
we have found it more useful to examine the
rate of change in the money stock than its
absolute level. The reason is that the upward
secular trend in the quantity of money has been
so strong that the quantity of money has fre-
quently tended to rise during both cyclical
expansions and cyclical contractions. Cyclical
forces show up much more clearly in the rate
at which the stock of money rises than in
whether it rises; or, alternatively, cyclical forces
show up more clearly in the deviations of the
stock of money from a secular trend.
We have used two alternative methods to
describe the timing of the cyclical fluctuations
in the rate of change in money. One is the
standard Bureau specific cycle analysis: we
date the months in which the series reaches
peaks and troughs, and designate the resulting
dates, the peaks and troughs in the rate of
change. However, we have been hesitant to
rely on this method alone. The major reason
is purely statistical. Rate-of-change series are
very erratic and jagged, having a characteristic
saw-tooth appearance. This often makes it
difficult to choose a particular month as the
peak or trough. Several months, sometimes
separated by a long interval, often seem about
equally plausible. A subsidiary reason we have
been hesitant to rely on the rate-of-change
peak and trough dates alone is analytical. What
feature of the money series is most relevantto the cycle is by no means clear; whether the
rate of change alone, or some cumulative total
such as the deviation from a trend.3
Accordingly, we have used a second method
of dating suggested by the empirical observa-
tion that the rate-of-change series often seemed
to move around the same level for a time and
then shift abruptly to a new level. This sug-
gested approximating the rate-of-change series
by a set of horizontal steps, which turn out
typically to alternate between high and low
steps. We designate as a "step peak" the month
in which a high step ends and is succeeded by
a low step, and as a "step trough" the month
in which a low step ends and is succeeded by
a high step. It turns out that these dates approx-
imate the dates at which the deviation from a
trend would reach a peak or trough. Their
use obviates the necessity of actually fitting
a trend.
We had hoped that one of these methods
would yield dates bearing a more consistent
relation to the timing of reference cycles than
the other, giving us a basis for choosing be-
tween the two methods. So far, this hope has
not been realized (see Table 11-1); the two
yield about equally consistent timing measures.
Hence, we have continued to use both, regard-
ing this as a way both to average out errors
and to take account of different characteristics
of the money series.
Both the rate-of-change peak and the step
peak in the money series tend regularly to
come earlier than the peak in general business
(the reference peak) to which we match them,
and both the rate-of-change trough and the
step trough to come earlier than the matched
reference trough. The interval is somewhat
longer at peaks than at troughs, and decidedly
longer for the rate-of-change turning points
than for the step turning points. On the average
of twenty-one matched cycles (from 1870 to
1961)therate-of-change peak comes 17
months earlier than the reference peak, and
3For a fuller discussion of this point and also some
of the other points considered in this subsection see
Friedman, "The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,"
Journal of Political Economy, Oct. 1961, pp. 447-466.
the step peak, 6 months earlier; the rate-of-
change trough comes 13 months earlier than
the reference trough, the step trough, 4 months
earlier. As to consistency, the rate-of-change
turning point comes earlier than the reference
turning point at every one of the 42 turning
points included in the above averages; the step
turning point does so in 29 out of the 42.
These regular and sizable leads of the money
series are themselves suggestive of an influence
running from money to business but they are
by no means decisive. One reason is that both
the monetary changes and the business changes
might be the common consequence of some
other influences which have their effect on
money more promptly than on business. A
second is that the characteristics of business
change affecting money may not be those that
are dated by the Bureau reference dates.
The most important reason, however, why
the consistent leads of the money series are not
decisiveisthat, given a recurrent cyclical
process, these leads may be simply the reflec-
tion of an earlier influence of business on
money; they may be a statistical artifact result-
ing from our matching the turning points in
money with the wrong turning points in busi-
ness. Instead of matching a peak in the money
series with the subsequent reference peak, we
could match it with the prior reference trough;
similarly, we could match the rate of change
trough with the prior reference peak. This pro-
cedure yields shorter average timing differences
for the rate-of-change dates—an average lag
of 6 months at reference peaks and 13 months
at reference troughs—and longer average tim-
ing differences for the step dates—an average
lag of 16 months at reference peaks and 19
months at reference troughs.4
The question whether itis preferable to
interpret the money series as mainly conform-
40f course, given a recurrent cycle, a money peak
could be matched with a prior reference peak as well,
and similarly for the trough, implying a long-delayed
positive effect of business on money; or a money peak
and trough, with a succeeding reference trough and
peak, implying a long-delayed inverted effect of money
on business, and so on. We have restricted the discus-
sion to the simplest alternative interpretations.
13ing positively to the cycle with a lead or in-
vertedly with a lag is therefore relevant to the
more general question whether the predomi-
nant direction of influence is from money to
business. All theoretical analysis I know of
which would explain how money can play an
independent role in the cyclical process also
implies that the connection is positive, that is,
that unusually high rates of rise in money
promote business expansion, unusually low
rates, business contraction. Hence, inverted
conformity, whether with a lag or a lead,
would sharply contradict the existence of a
strong influence from money to business, and
positive conformity, especially with a lead,
would be consistent with such an influence.
On the other hand, many of the links between
business and money, as Cagan has shown, may
be expected to produce an inverted response;
the clearest example is the tendency of business
expansion to produce gold outflows and hence
downward pressure on high-powered money.
Inverted conformity with a lag would there-
fore be entirely consistent with an influence
running from business to money. Positive con-
formity could be, too, since some of the effects
of business on money are in a positive direc-
tion, for example, the effect of business
sion on bank reserve ratios. However, it is not
easy to rationalize positive conformity with a
lead as reflecting supply response.
The nub of these considerations is that in-
verted conformity would clearly contradict a
predominant influence of money on business;
positive conformity would be consistent with
such an influence and, especially with a lead,
would constitute evidence in favor of it but
would not rule out an influence of business on
money. And, of course, as with the more
general question, positive and inverted con-
formity are not mutually exclusive; both exist,
and both are plausible. The question is, which
is dominant.
How can our timing measures help us choose
between positive and inverted conformity? One
obvious answer is by seeing which interpreta-
tion yields more consistent timing measures.
Are the leads or lags more nearly the same
from cycle to cycle on one interpretation than
14
on the other?
Table 11-1, which comes from our unfinished
manuscript, "Trends and Cycles," contains the
relevant evidence. It gives, for all cycles from
1870 to 1961, the dispersion (as measured by
the standard deviation) of the leads and lags
as computed under the two interpretations and
as determined both from rate-of-change and
step dates. The dispersion is uniformly lower
when the money series is treated as conforming
positively, and the difference is substantial.5
So far as this evidence goes, it clearly supports
positive conformity.
(4) SERIAL CORRELATION OF AMPLITUDES
OF CYCLE PHASES
A very different kind of evidence on positive
versus inverted conformity is provided by the
size of cyclical movements in money. In order
to explain what this evidence is, I shall again
have to digress, this time to describe a most
interesting feature of business cycle behavior
which has implications for many problems be-
sides the one under discussion.
The feature in question is the relation be-
tween successive phases of business cycles. Is
the magnitude of an expansion related system-
atically to the magnitude of the succeeding
contraction? Does a boom tend on the average
to be followed by a large contraction? A mild
expansion, by a mild contraction? To find out,
we have used two different measures of the
amplitude of cyclical phases: one, the Moore
index,6 as an indicator of the change in the
physical volume of activity; the other, the vol-
51f the standard deviations on the two interpreta-
tions could be regarded as statistically independent of
one another and each based on independent observa-
tions, the ratio of the larger to the smaller that would
be exceeded by chance less than one time in twenty
would be 1.46, and less than one time in 100, 1.73.
For three of the four comparisons in Table II-!, the
ratio considerably exceeds the latter level, and for the
fourth, the former. The specified conditions are not
satisfied by these data but itis not clear in which
direction the comparison is biased.
6The Moore index is our designation of an average
of three trend-adjusted indexes of general business
used by Burns and Mitchell (Measuring Business
Cycles, p. 403) as a broad indicator of the amplitudeTABLE 11-1
COMPARISON OF TIMING MEASUREMENTS OF RATE OF CHANGE IN
MONEY STOCK ON POSITIVE AND INVERTED BASIS, 1870-1961
KIND OF SPECIFIC CYCLE TURN IN
RATE OF CHANGEIN MONEY STOCK
Last Month of Step at:
Trough or Peak







Positive basis —4.0 —6.1 —13.2 —16.9
Inverted basis 19.5 15.6 12.8 6.4
Standard deviation
of lead or lag,
in months
Positive basis 5.6 7.1 6.0 7.6
Inverted basis 11.7 15.8 15.1 12.3
Number of observations 21 21 21 21
NOTES Matching with reference turns follows Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C.
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1946, PP. 115-128, with a
few exceptions. Strict adherence to the Burns and Metchell procedure would not
reverse the finding that the standard deviations are larger on the inverted basis than
on the positive basis.
SOURCE: Money stock: 1870-1946, from A Monetary History, Table A-i, col.
8; 1947-61, Supplement to Banking and Monetary Statistics, Sect.1, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Oct. 1962, pp. 20-22.
ume of bank clearings or debits, as an indicator
of the change in money values. Lines 2 and 3
of Table 11-2 (which, like Table 11-1, is taken
from the present draft of "Trends and Cycles")
show that, when the amplitude of an expansion
is correlated with the amplitude of the succeed-
ing contraction, the resulting correlation is
negligible for both measures. Surprisingly, per-
haps, there appears to be no systematic con-
nection between the size of an expansion and
of the succeeding contraction, whether size
of cycles, and revised and extended by Geoffrey H.
Moore (Business Cycle Indicators, G. H. Moore, ed.,
Princeton for NBER, 1961, Vol. I, p. 104; and an
unpublished memorandum).
is measured. by physical volume or by dollar
value.
Let us now ask the same question, except
that we start with a contraction and ask how
its amplitude is related to that of the succeeding
expansion. As lines 5 and 6 of Table 11-2 show,
the results are very different for the physical-
volume measure though much the same for
the dollar-value measure. A large contraction
in output tends to be followed on the average
by a large business expansion; a mild con-
traction, by a mild expansion.
This phenomenon, if it should be confirmed
by a fuller analysis of data for the United
States and other countries, would have impor-
tant implications for the analysis of business
cycles in general, not solely for our monetary
15TABLE 11-2
RANK DIFFERENCE CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGE IN ONE CYCLE PHASE AND
CHANGE IN NEXT SUCCEEDING CYCLE PHASE, RATE OF CHANGE IN MONEY AND





Series Correlated with Itself 1879-19081908-611879-1961
Expansion in Indicated Series and
Succeeding Contraction in Same Series
1.Rate of change in money stock,
per cent per month in specific cycles —.02 .33 .24
2. Moore index, in specific cycle relatives
(indicator of physical change in
general business) —.07 .10 .10
3.Clearings-debits, in reference cycle
relatives (indicator of dollar-value
change in general business) —.05 —.39 .15
Number of pairs 8 10 18
Contraction in Indicated Series and
Succeeding Expansion in Same Series
4.Rate of change in money stock,
per cent per month in specific cycles .83 .68 .74
5. Moore index, in specific cycle
relatives .71 .85 .86
6.Clearings-debits, in reference
cycle relatives —.17 .46 .26
Number of pairs 8 7 15
NOTE: War cycles 1914-19 and 1938-45 are omitted because of their special charac-
teristics. The 1945-49 cycle is omitted because the expansion is skipped by the rate-of-change
in money series. Specific cycles are those matched with reference cycles in the column
headings. There was a one-to-one correspondence between specific and reference cycles.
SOURCE: Money stock: see Table 11-1. Specific cycle analysis follows Burns and
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, pp. 115-141.
Moore index: Unpublished memorandum by Geoffrey H. Moore, extending table
in Measuring Business Cycles, p. 403, and revising and updating table in Business Cycle
Indicators, Vol. I, p. 104. An average of three trend-adjusted indexes of business activity—
A.T.&T., Persons-Barrons, and Ayres—each of which was analyzed for specific cycles,
suppressing specific cycle turns not corresponding to reference cycle turns.
Clearings-debits: Bank clearings outside New York City, monthly,
1879-1919: bank debits outside New York City, monthly, 1919-61.
1879-1942: Seasonally adjusted from Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1 945,
Bureau of the Census, 1949, pp. 324-325, 337-338.
1943-61: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Bank Operations,
mimeographed table, "Bank Debits and Rates of Turnover" (C.5, Revised Series, 1943-52),
Dec. 23, 1953; thereafter Federal Reserve Bulletin, adjusted for seasonal variation by
NBER. Reference cycle analysis follows Burns and Mitchell Measuring, pp. 160-170.
Values of the rank-difference correlation coefficient that would be exceeded in absolute
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.71 .64 .56 .44
.79 .74 .65 .52





16studies. For one thing, it would cast grave
doubt on those theories that see as the source
of a deep depression the excesses of the prior
expansion.7 For another, it would raise serious
questions about both the analytical models, in
terms of which most of us have come to ap-
proach the analysis of cycles, and the statistical
methods we use to analyze them.
Our analytical models generally involve a
conception of a self-generating cycle, in which
each phase gives rise to the next, and which
may be kept going by a sequence of random
shocks each giving rise to a series of damped
perturbations.The correspondingphysical
analogy is of an electrical network in which
responses are described by sine waves. The
asymmetric serial correlation pattern suggests
that this analogy may be misleading, that a
better one is what can be termed a plucking
model. Consider an elastic string stretched taut
between two points on the underside of a rigid
horizontal board and glued lightly to the board.
Let the string be plucked at a number of points
chosen more or less at random with a force
that varies at random, and then held down at
the lowest point reached. The result will be
to produce a succession of apparent cycles in
the string whose amplitudes depend on the
force used in plucking the string. The cycles
are symmetrical about their troughs; each con-
traction is of the same amplitude as the suc-
ceeding expansion. But there is no necessary
connection between the of an ex-
pansion and the amplitude of the succeeding
contraction. Correlations between the ampli-
tudes of successive phases would be asym-
metric in the same way the correlations in lines
2 and 5ofTable 11-2 are. Expansions would
be uncorrelated with succeeding contractions,
but contractions would be correlated with suc-
7The major qualification that must be attached to
our result for this purpose is the definitions of the
cycle and of expansion and contraction phases on
which it rests. Proponents of the view cited might well
argue that what matters is the cumulative effect of
several expansions, as we define them, and that the
relevant concept of expansion is of a "major" expan-
sion or a phase of a long cycle.
ceeding expansions. Up to this point, the peaks
in the series would all be at the same level.
To complete the analogy, we can suppose the
board to be tilted to allow for trend and the
underside of the board to be irregular to gen-
erate variability in the peaks, which would
also introduce something less than perfect cor-
relation between the of contractions and
subsequent expansions.
In this analogy, the irregular underside of
the rigid board corresponds to the upper limit
to output set by the available resources and
methods of organizing them. Output is viewed
as bumping along the ceiling of maximum feas-
ible output except that every now and then it
is plucked down by a cyclical contraction.
Given institutional rigidities in prices, the con-
traction takes in considerable measure the form
of a decline in output. Since there is no phys-
ical limit to the decline short of zero output,
the size of the decline in output can vary
widely. When subsequent recovery sets in, it
tends to return output to the ceiling; it cannot
go beyond, so there is an upper limit to output
and the amplitude of the expansion tends to
be correlated with the amplitude of the con-
traction.
For series on prices and money values, the
situation is different. The very rigidity in prices
invoked to explain the decline in output may
mean that the declines in prices vary less in
size than the declines in output. More impor-
tant, there is no physical ceiling, so that there
is nothing on this level of analysis to prevent
the string from being plucked up as well as
down. These differences make it plausible that
the asymmetric correlation would be much less
marked in money-value series than in output
and perhaps entirely absent in price series.
This is so for the correlations in Table 11-2,
which are small for clearings-debits. The same
conclusion is suggested also by graphic inspec-
tion of a wide variety of physical volume and
price series. A symmetric pattern of downward
pluckings can be clearly seen in many of the
physical volume series; such a pattern is much
less clear in the price series; and, in some price
series, symmetric upward pluckings seem about
as numerous.
17The contrast between the physical-volume
and dollar-value or price series can be put
somewhat differently. The indicated pattern
in physical-volume series is readily understand-
able regardless of the reason for the cyclical
fluctuations in the series—of the source of the
pluckings, as it were. A similar pattern in value
or price series would have to be explained
by some similar pattern or asymmetry in the
source of the cyclical fluctuations, some factor
that prevents upward plucking from being as
important as downward plucking.
Let us now return to our major theme and
see how we can use this feature of business
cycles to get additional evidence on the appro-
priate interpretation of the money series. If
positive conformity is dominant, and if the
monetary changes are linked with physical-
volume changes, then the serial correlations
for money should be the same as for the Moore
index. On the other hand, if inverted conform-
ity is dominant, and changes in business pro-
duce later changes in the opposite direction
in money, then the correlations for money
should be the opposite of those for the Moore
index, that is, the amplitude of an expansion
should be correlated with that of the succeed-
ing contraction; and the amplitude of a con-
traction should be uncorrelated with that of
the succeeding expansion.
The relevant correlations for the specific
cycle amplitudes of the rate of change in money
are given in lines 1 and 4 of Table 11-2. We
have as yet no parallel analysis for step ampli-
tudes, though we plan one. The correlations
we have for money are roughly the same as
for the Moore index. The simplest interpreta-
tion of this result is that the pattern for busi-
ness is a reflection of the pattern for money.
In terms of our analogy, every now and then
the money string is plucked downward. That
produces, after some lag, a downward move-
ment in economic activity related in magnitude
to the downward movement in money. The
money string then rebounds, and that in turn
produces, after some lag, an upward movement
in economic activity, again related in magni-
tude to the upward movement in money. Since
the downward and subsequent upward move-
18
ments in money are correlated in amplitude
with one another,soare downward and
subsequent upward movements in economic
activity. Since the upward and subsequent
downward movements in money are not cor-
related in amplitude, neither are the upward
and subsequent downward movements in eco-
nomic activity.
Personally, I find this bit of evidence in favor
of dominant positive conformity particularly
persuasive for two reasons. The first is that I
have been unable to construct an explanation
of how the observed asymmetric correlation
pattern for money could be produced by an
inverted response of money to business cycles.
The second is that our historical studies have
uncovered a number of episodes that corre-
spond precisely to the notion of downward
pluckings of the money string.
(5)EVIDENCEFROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES
All the evidence sofarcitedisforthe
United States. In addition, there is much evi-
dence of a similar kind for other countries.8
Cagan's earlier work on hyperinflations pro-
vides some striking results of a positive rela-
tionship for rather extreme monetary episodes.9
Several studies on Chile, done by students or
faculty members of the University of Chicago,
provide persuasive evidence of a more mod-
8Jexcludethe well-known studies which deal chiefly
with long-period secular rather than short-period
cyclical relations, such as Earl J. Hamilton's classic
work on the price revolution in the sixteenth century
as a result of the inflow of specie from the New
World, or J. E. Cairnes' "Essays Toward A Solution
of the Gold Question" (Essays in Political Economy,
London, Macmillan, 1873, pp. 1-165), in which he
analyzed in advance the effects to be expected from
the gold discoveries in Australia and California and
then after the event added postscripts checking his
predictions with the actual outcome—one of the
earliest and still one of the best applications of the
scientific method in economics.
9Phillip Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyper-
inflation,"in Studies inthe Quantity Theory of
Money, Milton Friedman, ed., University of Chicago
Press, 1956.erate though still substantial inflation.10 Some
unpublished work on Canada by George Mace-
sich demonstrates that the timing relations
between monetary and economic change there
are very similar to the relations in the United
States.
In order to expand the range of evidence on
this and related issues, I went on something of
a fishing expedition last year (on leave from
both the University of Chicago and the National
Bureau) to explore the data available for for-
eign countries differing as widely as possible
from the United States, and to learn something
about their monetary arrangements. The coun-
tries I studied in some detail were Yugoslavia,
Greece, Israel, India, and Japan. For each,
I collected data on the quantity of money,
income, prices, indexes of industrial produc-
tion, interest rates, and the like. There is no
doubt that sufficient data are available to make
comparative studies feasible.
So far, I have been able to do little analysis
of the data I gathered. But even that superficial
analysis has uncovered some interesting bits
of additional evidence on the direction of influ-
ence. For Yugoslavia, for example, there hap-
pens to be an episode for which the direction
of relation is hardly doubtful: the stock of
currency (which seems the appropriate meas-
ure of "money" for such a country) and income
in current prices both have been rising rather
rapidly in the past decade, with one marked
exception in both. There is one year in each
series in which the upward trend is replaced
by a horizontal movement. That year comes
one year earlier in the currency series than in
the money income series! For Israel, the data,
which are carefully compiled, show roughly
the same relation between rates of change as
for the United States, with rates of change in
currency leading rates of change in income by
about a year. For Japan, cyclical fluctuations
lOJohn Deaver, "The Chilean Inflation and the
Demand for Money," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1960; Arnold C. Harberger,
"The Dynamics of Inflation in Chile," in Carl Christ
et a!., Measurement in Economics, Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1963, pp. 219-250.
of the past ten years or so seem readily inter-
preted as a strictly self-generating monetary
cycle in response to changes in the rate of
change in the money stock. The contractionary
monetary changes are produced by the reac-
tions of the monetary authorities to recurrent
balance of payments difficulties, which are a
responsetopriorexpansionary monetary
changes that occur when the balance of pay-
ments eases. The Japanese data show about
a three- six-months' lead of the rate of change
in the money supply over the rate of change
in production and prices. We have as yet no
conceptually similar timing comparisons for
the United States, though we are in the process
of making them. Perhaps the closest are the
timing comparisons between the step dates and
reference turns. Those show a roughly similar
lead.
(6) THE COMBINED WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE
In a scientific problem, the final verdict is
never in. Any conclusion must always be sub-
ject to revision in the light of new evidence.
Yet I believe that the available evidence of
the five kinds listed justifies considerable con-
fidence in the conclusion that the money series
is dominated by positive conformity, which
reflects in some measure an independent influ-
ence of money on business. The feedback
effect of business on money, which undoubtedy
also exists, may contribute to the positive con-
formity and may also introduce a measure of
inverted conformity.
In the "Trends and Cycles" volume, we
hope to carry farther our analysis of the evi-
dence based on the timing and amplitude of
fluctuations in the money series (subsections
3 and 4). We have no present plans for doing
any further work on the qualitative historical
evidence or on that provided by the determi-
nants of the money stock (subsections 1 and
2). Data for foreign countries (subsection 5)
meritmuch fuller analysis, and I have inter-
ested a number of students in research for
doctoral dissertations which will make a start
in that direction. However, this is not part of
19the Bureau's program, though it is obviously
relevant to our common intellectual interests.
4. OUR CENTRAL QUALITATIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS
The central conclusion we have reached in
our studies is of a piece with that reached
on the specific issue considered in the preceding
section, and like that, though still tentative,
in our opinion justifies much confidence. Stated
simply, it is that money does matter and mat-
ters very much. Changes in the quantity of
money have important, and broadly predict-
able, economic effects. Long-period changes
in the quantity of money relative to output
determine the secular behavior of prices. Sub-
.stantial expansions in the quantity of money
over short periods have been a major proxi-
mate source of the accompanying inflation
in prices. Substantial contractions in the quan-
•tity of money over short periods have been
a major factor in producing severe economic
contractions. And cyclical variations in the
quantity of money may well be an important
element in the ordinary mild business cycle.
These qualitativeconclusions, and even
more specific quantitative findings, are impor-
tant. But they are also limited. Because they
go sharply counter to what has been so widely
believed for nearly two decades, there has
been some tendency to interpret our claims
as being far more than they are. For example,
one newspaper story referring to similar views
interpreted them as asserting that "the growth
of the money supply is the single most impor-
tant factor affecting the nation's economy"—
which is very far indeed from what we are
saying. To avoid misunderstanding, let me
state explicitly some of the limitations of our
conclusions.
One limitation is linked to the distinction
between "real" magnitudes—relative prices,
quantities of output, levels of employment,
efficiency of production, accumulation of capi-
tal, and the like—and "nominal" magnitudes—
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absolute prices, quantity of money, nominal
money income, and so on. The quantity of
money in general appears not to be an impor-
tant factor affecting secular changes in the real
magnitudes. They are determined primarily by
such basic phenomena as the kind of economic
system, the qualities of the people, the state
of technology, the availability of natural re-
sources, and so on. These, not monetary insti-
tutions or policy, are the critical factors that
ultimately determine the "wealth of nations"
and of their citizens. In general, the major
long-run impact of the quantity of money is
on nominal magnitudes, and especially on the
absolute level of prices. Our conclusions are
in no way inconsistent with that celebrated—
and much misunderstood—statement of John
Stuart Mill, "There cannot, in short, be intrin-
sically a more insignificant thing, in the econ-
omy of society, than money; except in the char-
acter of a contrivance for sparing time and
labor. It is a machine for doing quickly and
commodiously, what could be done, though
less quickly and commodiously, without it; and
like many other kinds of machinery, it only
exerts a distinct and independent influence of
its own when it gets out of order."
What we can now add to this is a much more
explicit specification of what it means for the
machinery of money to "get out of order." It
gets out of order, we have tentatively con-
cluded, when the quantity of money behaves
erratically, when either its rate of increase is
sharply stepped up—which will mean price
inflation—or sharply contracted—which will
mean economic depression—and especially
when such erratic movements succeed one
another. One of our major findings is that, over
periods spanning several cycles, the average
rate of growth of the stock of money—so long
as it is relatively stable and within moderate
limits—has no discernible effect on the rate
of growth of real output. Differences in mone-
tary growth are reflected instead in prices. Our
findings give no support to the view, now widely
popular, that long-run inflation is favorable to
l'Principles of Political Economy (1848), Ashley
ed., Longmans, Green, 1929, p. 488.economic growth. Deviations from the average
rate of growth of the stock of money, if sharp,
account for the inflations or severe contractions
already referred to. If mild, the deviations are
linked to the usual business cycle, and appear
to be reflected partly in prices and partly in
quantity, though we know little as yet about
what determines how much of the effect is on
prices and how much on quantity. The general
subject of the division of changes in money
income between prices and quantity badly
needs more investigation. None of our leading
economic theories has much to say about it.
Yet knowledge about it is needed for better
understanding of the impact not only of mone-
tary changes but also of other factors signifi-
cant in the business cycle.
A second limitation is linked to the dis-
tinction between average behavior and be-
havior in a particular episode. The fact that
we can predict within fairly narrow limits the
number of heads that will come up in a thou-
sand tosses of a fair coin does not enable us to
predict what will come up the next time. As
students of business cycles, we are concerned
largely with average behavior. The data for
any particular episode are bound to be subject
to considerable errors of measurment and to
be affected by casual events peculiar to that
episode. We can largely compensate for both
bad data and erratic behavior by constructing
averages for a number of episodes. The results
may be well established, on the average, yet
not reliable for predicting an individual case.
Our earlier discussion of cyclical timing is an
excellent example. As noted above, data on
the month-to-month changes in the quantity
of money are highly erratic and irregular, and
there is often much uncertainty for an indi-
vidual cycle about which month shows the
highest rate of change (rate-of-change peak),
or which month is followed by a shift in the
rate of change to a lower level (step peak).
Hence there is also much uncertainty about
the difference in time between the rate-of-
change peak and the reference peak or between
the step peak and the reference peak—a date
which is itself subject to error. But such errors
may be expected to cancel out, so the average
timing may be well determined. For example,
in the course of 21 matched cycles from 1870
to 1961, the estimated difference in timing
between the step peak and the reference peak
varied from a lag of 4 months to a lead of 17
months with a standard deviation of 7 months.
These estimated differences average out to a
lead of 6 months, and this average is rather
accurately determined. The standard error of
the average is only 1.6 months, which means
that the odds are 2 to 1 that the error in the
average time is less than 1.6 months and 20
to 1 that it is less than 3.2 months.
Looked at another way, the fact that, on the
average, the step peak comes 6 months before
the estimated reference peak does not enable
us to say very much about any particular occa-
sion. Even if we could know that an observed
shift to a lower rate of growth of the money
stock is one that we would later regard as a
step peak—much easier to know by hindsight
than at the time—about the most we could
say would be that there was roughly a 50-50
chance that a turn in business that we could
later regard as a reference peak would occur
between 1 and 11 months later. Our inability
to be more precise may reflect our inability to
measure the various magnitudes very accur-
ately, or it may reflect inherent variability in
the economic response to monetary stimuli.
At the present stage of our knowledge, we do
not know which.
Our assertion that money matters is there-
fore very far indeed from an assertion that we
know enough about the role it plays and can
measure sufficiently accurately the relevant
magnitudes to predict precisely what effect an
observed change in the quantity 'of money will
have in a particular case. Needless to say, the
aim of further research is to improve the preci-
sion of such predictions.
A third Iimitatián, and the last one I shall
mention, is that we are still a long way from
having a detailed and tested theory of the
mechanism that links money with other eco-
nomic magnitudes. For long-period secular
changes, for short-period rapid inflations, and
for severe contractions, there exist reasonably
well-formulated theories and a good deal of
21empirical evidence on transmission mechan-
isms. But for the ordinary business cycle, we
are in a much less satisfactory position. In
"Money and Business Cycles," we sketched
very broadly some of the possible lines of con-
nection between monetary changes and ecó-
nomic changes "in order," as we wrote, "to
provide a plausible rationalization of our em-
pirical findings... toshow that a monetary
theory of cyclical fluctuations can accommo-
date a wide variety of other empirical findings
about cyclical regularities, and... tostimulate
others to elaborate the theory and render it
more specific."2 We shall try to improve and
elaboratethissketchin our "Trends and
Cycles" volume, but I am not sure just how
far we can get within the limits we have im-
posed for ourselves. Identification of the chan-
nels through which short-run monetary changes
work their effects, and specification in quanti-
tative terms of the characteristics of the chan-
nels and of the effects exerted through them,
remain major tasks for future research.
5. THE STOCK OF MONEY AND
RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
A look at recent history will enable us to
illustrate many of the points made in the pre-
ceding sections and to show the relevance of
some of our findings to current problems.
The upper panel of Chart 11-1 shows for
the past seven years three series:(1) the
money stock, as we define it, which is to say
currency plus all commercial bank deposits
adjusted; (2) currency plus demand deposits
adjusted only, an alternative concept which is
often referred to as the money supply; (3) the
Federal Reserve index of industrial production,
as a single index of the physical volume of
general economic activity. The vertical scale
is logarithmic, to show relative not absolute
changes.
l2Frieclman and Schwartz, "Money and Business
Cycles," p. 59.
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The two money series illustrate why the
total stock of money is not of itself a very
useful magnitude for studying cyclical move-
ments. The series are smooth and dominated
by their trends. Cyclical fluctuations show up
in the form of waves about the trend and only
occasionally in the form of absolute ups and
downs. For this period, there is only one abso-
lute decline in the money stock series (from
1959 to 1960). The trends of the two series
differ much more for that period than for most,
reflecting the recent rapid rise in the time de-
posits of commercial banks, apparently largely
in response to the successive rises in the rates
of interest banks have been permitted, and
have been willing, to pay on them. But aside
from the trend, it is perhaps obvious even from
these series that the two show very much the
same movements.
The series on industrial production is much
less smooth. It shows three decided declines:
the first, a reflection of the 1957-58 recession;
the second, of the steel strike—this one, we
would be inclined to smooth out as a random
movement; and the third, of the 1960-6 1 reces-
sion. The letters T and P at the bottom of
each panel on the chart correspond to the
months designated by the Bureau as reference
troughs and peaks,respectively. The first
trough coincides with the upturn in the pro-
duction index; the succeeding peak comes three
months after the downturn in the production
index; and the second trough, one month after
the upturn in the production index.
Whereas the money series represent stocks
at successive points of time —likethe stock
of housing or the level of inventories—the
index of industrial production represents a
flow—like new construction or additions to
inventories. This is a major reason the produc-
tion index is so much more variable than the
money series are.
In the lower panel of Chart Il-i, we have
converted the money series into flow series,
also, by plotting the month-to-month percent-
age changes in them. They show the cyclical
fluctuations much more clearly. The character-
istic saw-tooth pattern in first-difference series






















































The horizontal broken lines represent high and low steps in the rate of change.
T and P show reference cycle turning points.
23picking single months to represent the peaks
and troughs. This segment of time, 1957-63,
also shows clearly the tendency—noted above
for much earlier periods—of the rate of change
to move around a rather constant level and
then shift to a new level. The horizontal lines
are the "steps" with which we have approxi-
mated the series, and the ends of the steps are
our step peaks and step troughs. For this seg-
ment, the step dates seem less ambiguous than
the specific cycle dates, but for other segments
the opposite is true.
Comparison of the two money series in
the lower panel illustrates our general finding
that the substantive results do not depend on
which particular definition is used. The two
series are obviously closely parallel. The only
appreciable differences are in early 1958 and in
early. 1962, when the rate of change of the
broader series is higher relative to its level
before and after than is the rate of change of
the narrower series. The reason for the first
difference is not clear. The second comes im-
mediately after the Board of Governors raised
the rates of interest that commercial banks
were permitted to pay on time deposits. The
dates we have chosen for the ends of our steps
are identical for both definitions, except the
low step in early 1962. We date that step as
beginning February 1962 and ending August
1962, for the narrower concept, and as begin-
ning May 1962 and ending September 1962,
for the broader. Because of the disturbances
introduced by the change in the rates of inter-
est on time deposits, we are inclined to prefer
the date derived from the narrower concept—
but clearly, no great error will be introduced,
whichever is used.
Comparison of the money series with the
production index illustrates the positive con-
formity and the lead that we have found so
characteristic, as well as the variability of the
lead. To bring this out arrows have been drawn
from the ends of the steps in the rate-of-change
money series in the lower panel and from the
corresponding dates on the stock series in the
upper panel to the turning points of the pro-
duction index. For •the step dates, the leads
at the two troughs are 3 months and 7 months
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(8 months to the terminal reference trough)
and at the intervening peak 6 months (10
months to the reference peak). These are cer-
tainly very much in line with the average timing
over the past 90 years, which is 4 months at the
trough and 6 months at the peak (see Table
IT-i). So this segment illustrates very well the
stability we have found in monetary relations.
The reason for drawing the arrows from the
stock series as well as from the rate-of-change
series is to show how the movements which
show up so clearly in the rate-of-change series
can be seen also in the stock series, once one
looks for them.
The money series show a low step in 1962
that we have so far not matched witfr any
corresponding movement in the upper panel
for the production index. However, though the
production index has risen since early 1961
except for an occasional month, it is clear that
there was a distinct retardation in late 1962.
The retardation was the source of much con-
cern at the time and was associated with the
lower level of national income attained than
had been forecast early in the year. To bring
that movement into sharper relief, we have
used the same technique for the production
index as for the money series, namely, plotted
month-to-month percentage changes. This ser-
ies is even more erratic than the money series,
but there is clearly a low step in 1962 to cor-
respond with the low step in the money series.
Its onset, as we have dated it, comes 2 months
after the beginning of the low step in currency
and demand deposits, and 1 month before that
in the broader money total. The shift to a new
higher level comes 5 months after the shift to
a higher level in the rate of change in money.
This minor perturbation in industrial pro-
duction will not and should not be classified
by the National Bureau as a reference cycle;
hence, neither its occurrence, its correspond-
ence to the shift in money, nor the timing of
the two movements would be revealed in a
standard Bureau cyclical analysis. This is one
of that species of subcycles that Ruth Mack
has brought to our attention. The existence of
such episodes is one of the reasons we plan
to supplement the standard cycle analysis inour "Trends and Cycles" volume with corre-
lation analysis of at least quarterly series.
The chart shows very much wider fluctua-
tions in industrial production than in the rate
of change in money series. If instead of indus-
trial production a measure of aggregate output
bad been used, the contrast would have been
narrower but still present. The contrast is even
greater for aggregate money income than for
output. We reported in "Money and Business
Cycles" that, on the average, the percentage
fluctuations in income were twice as large as
those in the rate of change in money and offered
a hypothesis to explain why this should be so.
So far, I have used the recent period to
illustrate some of our technical problems and
some of our descriptive findings. But it can
also serve to illustrate the problems of interpre-
tation. I have described Chart 11-1 entirely in
terms of a positive conformity of the money
series; trying to describe it in terms of inverted
conformity will perhaps suggest some of the
difficulties we have fOund with such an inter-
pretation and some of the reasons we have
rejected it. The still more important question
is whether we should interpret the positive
conformity as reflecting the influence of money
on business, or of business on money. If these
were the only alternatives, I would find the
former much more appealing for this segment
of time in particular. There have been in this
period five rather clear-cut shifts in monetary
action—as judged by the rate of change in the
stock of money. Each has been followed after
some months (with one possible exception,
early 1962, if the link is made with the broader
money series) by a shift in the same direction
in the rate of growth of economic activity, as
judged by the production index. Perhaps this
pattern reflects the common effect of some
third force; it is hard to explain it by any direct
influence of business on money.
MILTON FRIEDMAN
THE BEHAVIOR AND DETERMINANTS OF
INTEREST RATES: A PROGRESS REPORT
The interest-rate project is the most recent of
a number of major studies of financial markets
made by grants from the Life Insur-
ance Association of America. Our work has
benefited substantially from the advice and
assistance of an Advisory Committee under
the chairmanship of W. Braddock Hickman,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. The research is being conducted by
Jack Guttentag (University of Pennsylvania),
Morris Beck (Rutgers University), Avery
Cohan (University of North Carolina), Wil-
liam H. Brown, Jr. (Swarthmore College),
Phillip Cagan (Brown University), Reuben
Kessel (University of Chicago), and myself.
The present project consists of six studies.
In two of them, we examine important but
neglected sectors of the capital market: mort-
gages and direct placements. In two, we study
interest-rate behavior through time: seasonal
and cyclical movements. In two, we study spe-
cific aspects of the linkage of markets: the
25term structure of rates and the new-outstanding
yield spread on corporates. I shall report on
each of these in turn.
1. THE MORTGAGE MARKET
This study is being directed by Jack Guttentag,
with a major segment of the work, the task of
data gathering, under the direction of Morris
Beck. Mortgages are frequently overlooked in
discussion of interest rates and their determi-
nation. One reason is that we know far too little
about this market, and another is that the
quantitative importance of mortgages is often
inadequately recognized. In fact, the volume of
mortgage debt and its rate of growth far exceed
that of any other segment of the capital market.
Mortgage debt in the United States amounted
to $252 billion at the end of 1962, compared
with less than $95 billion in total corporate
long-term bonds and outstanding. Fur-
thermore, mortgage debt had risen 348 per
cent since 1948 compared with a rise of 192
per cent in corporate bonds. Chart 11-2 com-
pares annual increases in mortgage debt with
those in three other major categories of debt
between 1954 and 1962.
The mortgage market is of especial interest
not only because of its size but also for other
reasons. It is one of the sectors affording some
of the' clearest evidence of an influence of
interest rates on economic activity. Itis a
sector for which direct controls have been re-
peatedly suggested as an adjunct to monetary
policy. In this market government activity has
become extensive, including the FHA and the
VA programs as well as FNMA and other
agencies. In it, we can examine the effects of
partial interest-rate ceilings, as in the FHA and
VA programs.
Despite its importance, we know disturb-
ingly little about the mortgage market. Our
present study includes two major parts. The
first, a group of cross-section studies, is in-
tended chiefly to find the major yield-deter-
mining characteristics of mortgages other than
forces influencing interest rates generally. The
second will analyze the way mortgage rates have
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with that of yields on other securities. We pre-
sent here a sketch of findings to date.
YIELD-DETERMINING CHARACTERISTICS
The most important yield-determining char-
acteristics of residential mortgages appear to
be location of property, type of lender, size
of loan, and, under some circumstances, loan-
to-value ratios. The role of maturity cannot
be fully determined until further studyis
completed.
Location is one of the most important vari-
ables determining mortgage yields. We have not
yet been able to examine the important question
of differences in yield between rural and urban
behaved over time and compare their behavior
CHART11-2
Annual Changes in Debt Outstanding, 1954-62
Billion dollorsloans, but we have some information on yield
differences between regions. In 1953, conven-
tional mortgages authorized by large life insur-
ance companies in the three Pacific coast states
yielded an average of 4.86 per cent as com-
pared with 4.55percent in the Middle Atlantic
states. Similarly, in 1960, Pacific coast yields
were 6.13 per cent on the average, compared
with 5.95 per cent in the Middle Atlantic states.
The regional yield differentials are probably
larger among local lenders than among outside
lenders like the life insurance companies just
described.
That there is a significant difference in mort-
gage yields between different types of lenders
is well known. What has not been known is
whether this can be wholly explained by the
difference in type of loan made. Guttentag's
study of the Chicago data reveals that differ-
ences persist even when essentially identical
mortgages are compared. Among the three
types of institution for which adequate data
were available to permit comparisons, savings
and loan mortgage yields were highest, mort-
gage company yields next, and commercial
bank yields lowest. Yields on loans of both
savings and loan associations and commercial
banks tend to be inversely related to size of
lending institution(after taking account of
other yield-determining factors), but the ten-
dency is not uniform.
Size of loan affects yields through two chan-
nels, and the effects are opposite in direction.
First, the size of loan and the size of monthly
payments are highly correlated. Presumably,
high monthly payments (income held constant)
carry greater risk and result therefore in high
yields. Hence a positive correlation would
tend to be established between size of loan
and yield. However, when we bold monthly
payment constant, we find that size of• loan
is negatively correlated with yield. This sug-
gests that cost of processing per dollar of
loan is appreciably smaller on larger loans, so
that large loans generally yield significantly
less than small ones, when risk is held constant.
Differences in risk explain in important
measure observed differences between yields
on mortgage loans. One important risk variable
is size of loan relative to property value. As
one might expect, changes in the ratio of loan
to value make little difference in the yield when
the ratio is very low to begin with. The ratios
on conventional mortgages made by commer-
cial banks, for example, fall generally within
a range of 50-65 per cent and no relationship
to yield is evident. At higher ratios, however,
the relationship to yield is quite pronounced.
Even on VA mortgages, which carry a guaran-
tee, the loan-value ratio has a statistically
significant (although quantitatively modest)
effect on yield because the ratios range gener-
ally over 90 per cent.
The influence on yield of term to maturity
is one of the most difficult to unravel because
maturity is related to many other factors that
bear on yield. Longer-maturity mortgages, for
example, typically carry higher loan-value
ratios, which work toward higher yields. On
the other hand, longer mortgages also tend to
be larger, which works toward lower yields
(after account is taken of the monthly pay-
ment). Even abstracting from cost and risk
considerations, moreover, lenders have differ-
ent attitudes towardS maturity, because of dif-
ferent investment objectives. On conventional
mortgages on new homes made by savings and
loan associations in Chicago, there is a pro-
nounced positive relationship between yield
and maturity, after account is taken of other
factors. On loans covering existing properties,
however, which carry lower loan-value ratios
and higher income-loan ratios, no relationship
is evident. Generalization regarding the influ-
ence of maturity would be precarious until our
analysis is pushed further.
OTHER OBSERVATIONS
The cyclical timing of mortgage rates as com-
pared with that of other security yields looks
interesting, and we hope it may shed further
light on the determinants of interest rates gen-
erally. On the basis of incomplete data, the
27well-known tendency of mortgage rates to lag
behind bond yields appears to be appreciably
reduced by recording mortgage rates on author-
ization dates instead of disbursement dates,
but the tendency is not entirely eliminated.
The amplitude of the yield series for all mort-
gages authorized by life insurance companies
appears to be somewhat less than that of
government bonds.
2. DIRECT PLACEMENTS
The second sector of the capital market that
seemed to us especially in need of study is
the one in which corporate bonds are placed
directly through negotiation between borrower
and lender. As Chart 11-3 shows, this sector
of the market is quantitatively extremely im-
portant. The volume of newly issued direct
placements has averaged very close to that of
public offerings during the entire period shown.
In every year of the 1950's, substantially larger
amounts of new money were secured through
this avenue than through all new equity issues
including both common and preferred shares.
•The major growth of direct placements has
come in the last thirty years. Between 1900
and 1933 corporate direct placements were
only 3 per cent of all corporate debt offerings.
By 1935,thisratio had risen to 29 per cent
for industrial, financial, and service industries,
but it still remained relatively low for rails and
public utilities. As the chart shows, the impor-
tance of this financial procedure had grown
greatly by 1950. Between that year and the end
of 1961, $42.4 billion was borrowed through
this channel, an amount representing 46 per
cent of total corporate debt issues. The eco-
nomic contribution of the financial innovation
was clearly of tremendous importance. As
Avery Cohan, who is directing our study, has
stated, this procedure "made long range funds
available to a whole new range of borrowers—
especially those who were relatively small or
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CHART 11-3
New Long-Term Corporate Security Issues,
1950-61
unknown or who had reasonable but uncon-
ventional arrangements in mind," so that a
public bond offering would not have been
feasible.
As in the mortgage market, we wanted to
evaluate the yield-determining characteristics
of direct placements and to utilize this infor-
mation in constructing time series of yields for
homogeneous classifications of issues. Since
data permitting such a study are not publicly
available, it was necessary to go directly to
major lenders and copy the needed information,
item by item, from their records.
YIELD-DETERMINING VARIABLES
On the basis of interviews with practitioners
in the market for direct placements, Cohanselected 18 variables which might prove influ-
ential in determining yields. The variables in-
cluded financial characteristics of the company
issuing the debt and characteristics of the
security. These were used as independent
variables in 22 cross-section regressions, one
regression for each six-month period from
1951 through 1961.
The accompanying figures show the average
influence of each of the six most important
variables on industrials. The left-hand column
gives the percentage by which the yield of direct
placements would vary, if the variable meas-
ured moved within its entire range as experi-
enced during the .11-year period, other vari-
ables held constant. The right-hand column
gives similar results in basis points if a 4 per
cent yield level is used as base.
Independent Variable
Three of the variables (1, 3, and 4) are
measures of size of borrower or are commonly
correlated with size. The second most influ-
ential item, like size of borrower, is a measure
having direct bearing on the risk of the loan:
times interest earned. It is not highly correlated
with any other variable showing importance
as a yield determinant, and hence the influence
indicated above does not reflect the force of
other variables among the 18 we examined.
Finally, variables 5 and 6 both measure dura-
tion of loan. As would be expected, they are
highly correlated with one another.
With the possible exception of the variables
measuring duration Of loan, all the above vari-
ables influenced yield in the direction to be
expected. As for the exception: anyone famil-
iar with yield curves on outstanding publicly
offered bonds in recent times might expect yield
to rise with length of term. In fact, the opposite
effect is shown by our statistics, as a number
of experts in this market had anticipated.
Time series have not yet been thoroughly ana-
lyzed, though they have been plotted for four
categories of direct placement (see Chart IV-5,
page 114). Two observations are suggested by
these graphs. First, general yield movements
of direct placements since 1950 seem quite
similar to those on Moody averages of high-
grade securities. Second, yields on new pub-
licly issued bonds appear to have been rising
relative to the return on direct placements.
This means that if direct placement yields are
higher than yields on other bonds of compar-
Maxim urn Influence on Yield of
Direct Placements




able quality, as is generally assumed, the differ-
ential has been getting smaller over the decade.
Whether such a differential exists, and if so,
how large it is cannot now be determined from
our data because we have not yet derived a
link between Moody ratings and our own qual-
ity classifications.
Just as we decided upon two projects dealing
with important but neglected sectors of the
capital market, so we also decided to under-
take studies of two aspects of the movement of
yields over time. The first concerned the sea-
sonal behavior of interest rates. Toward the
end of the 1950's Frank Morris of the Invest-
ment Bankers Association and others were
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TIME SERIES
1.Total capitalization 31.8 127
2.Times interest-'earned (5-yr.average) 10.5 .42
3.Earnings before interest andtaxes 8.9 35
4.Size of issue
5.Maturity
6.Average term (including effects ofamortization)
3. SEASONAL BEHAVIORpublishing evidence of a seasonal movement in
certain interest rates. We decided to explore
that behavior with three major objectives in
mind. One was to determine whether there
really are identifiable seasonal patterns in inter-
est rate series, and if so to measure them. The
second was to make seasonal adjustments in
those interest-rate series requiring them in
order that adjusted series may be available for
cyclical analysis and other purposes. The third
was to learn what seem to be the causes of
seasonal patterns and what this information
might contribute to an understanding of interest
rates generally. William H. Brown, Jr.,is
carrying on this study.
The seasonal behavior of interest rates is
largely influenced by man-made seasonal phe-
nomena which prove to be highly unstable over
any extended period. Thus, tax dates have had
a dominant role in determining seasonal inter-
est rate movements, but the amount of taxes
collected in each of the four quarters changed
substantially over the decade studied. The deci-
sion of the government to issue or not to issue
tax-anticipation bills or certificates can greatly
influence"seasonal"interest-ratepatterns.
Correction for such seasonal movements is
just as important for business cycle study as
any other seasonal behavior is, but identifica-
tion of shifting seasonal patterns is extremely
difficult.
A major characteristic of any seasonal ad-
justment under these conditions is that the
adjustment will commonly vary from year to
year. Yet the process of identifying a seasonal
pattern is ordinarily one of averaging several
years together in order to weed out entirely
irregular movements. In consequence, seasonal
adjustment when the seasonal itself has shifted
must be an uneasy compromise. A major June
decline that might have resulted from a truly
irregular cause or even a cyclical one can influ-
ence averages that include several previous and
succeeding Junes, giving the appearance of a
seasonal low extending over several years. At
the same time, a change in the pattern of
seasonal movement may be fairly sudden, in
fact, but it will be spread out and softened by
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After considerable experimentation, our
final adjustments were made by the Bureau of
the Census Method II developed by Julius
Shiskin. This is a highly sophisticated proce-
dure and we know of none better, but our
findings will be badly misread if the limitations
referred to above are not kept in mind.
The clearest evidence of a seasonal pattern
is for short-term securities, especially three-
month Treasury bills. The seasonal adjustment
factors show a high in December during all ten
years 195 1-60. They show a low in June or
July nine of the ten years. Not only was this
pattern extremely stable, but also its amplitude
widened with a remarkably consistent trend
over the decade. Chart 11-4 depicts this trend
•and other regularities in the pattern of adjust-
ment factors for Treasury bills.
It should be emphasized that this record
provides no basis for future prediction, unless
the study of causation suggests that the under-
lying reasons for the pattern will probably per-
CHART 11-4
Weekly Seasonal Adjustment Factors
for Three-Month Treasury Bills, 1950, 1955, 1960
Index 1950
1960sist. As we show below, such prediction would
be highly inappropriate in this case.
The significance of these seasonal move-
ments may be more fully understood if they
are compared with other types of change. The
movements oftheoriginalseriesduring
1951-61 can be divided into three components:
seasonal, cyclical-secular, and irregular. The
ratio of the average monthly amplitude of one
type movement to that of another gives a
measure of their importance in terms of size.
Thus the ratio of the seasonal to the cyclical
for Treasury bills equals .94. The average
monthly "irregular" movement was slightly
higher than the seasonal, the ratio of seasonal
to irregular being .99. The ratio of the seasonal
movement to the average monthly change of
the original series was .55. Clearly, the sea-
sonal movements were highly significant not
only in their regularity, but also in their quan-
titative importance. Similar data for other
issues are provided in Table 11-3.
Two short-term rates in addition to Treasury
bills were examined. The over-all pattern of
behavior of yields on bankers' acceptances was
remarkably similar to that of Treasury bills,
both in timing and amplitude. Commercial
paper seasonals reveal some interesting differ-
ences. Seasonal highs are not in December but
October every year from 1952 to 1959; in
1960, the high moved to December. This pat-
tern is much closer to that of long-term cor-
porates than to that of bills. The lows on com-
mercial paper seasonals were in March from
1953 through 1956, again similar to the pattern
for corporate bonds. After 1956, low points
shifted to July, matching the behavior of Treas-
urybills.Forfurthercharacteristicssee
Table 11-3.
I have already commented in passing on
long-term corporates. The seasonal highs of
Moody Aaa corporates were in September
1954 through 1958, and then successively in
October and December. After 1953, bond
seasonals move almost uninterruptedly and
sharply from their lows in February or March
to their high in September, after which a sharp
decline contrasts severely with the "leveling
but still rising" movement of Treasury bill
seasonals as seen in Chart 11-4.
The timing of seasonal yield movements on
state and local issues and on governments fol-
lows the same pattern as that on highest grade
corporates. The evidence of a true seasonal in
highest grade long-term corporates and in gov-
ernments is weak, as indicated by low ampli-
tude, by a fundamental change in timing over
the decade, and by low statistical significance.
Analysis of the causes of seasonal movement
in interest rates is not yet completed, but a few
TABLE 11-3
SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT FACTORS, 1951 TO 1960
Av
Levels and Ratios of
erage Monthly Amplitudes
Level of Ratio:Ratio: Ratio:
SeasonalSeasonalSeasonal Signi-
Original to to to ficance
Type of Security Seriesa OriginalCyclicalIrregularby F-Test
Treasury bills 8.45 .55 0.94 .99 01
Bankers' acceptances 3.81 .61 0.70 1.04 .01
Commercial paper 3.77 .50 0.65 .75 .05
Aaa corporates 1.47 .47 0.75 .81 .05
U.S. long terms 2.00 .35 0.62 .53 ns
Aaastateandlocal 3.10 .51 1.00 .84 .05
aMeasured in basis points.ns —notsignificant.
31general comments may be made. There is a
variety of convincing evidence indicating that
a major cause of the seasonal movement in
Treasury bill yields is the seasonal variation
in government securities of less than one year
maturity held by the public. These fluctuations
in turn reflect the seasonal pattern of Treasury
receipts and expenditures. Confirming this pre-
sumption is the important fact that during the
years 1961 and 1962 two parallel changes may
be noted: (1) the seasonal in bill yields was
sharply reduced in 1961 and virtually elimi-
nated in 1962; (2) in 1961, the variation in
the supply of bills made available to the public
was reduced, and a much sharper reduction
occurred in 1962. Also, the variation in total
net cash borrowing from the public in 1962
was substantially smaller than in immediately
preceding years.
4. CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
Cyclical movements of interest rates, under
study by Philip Cagan, are important both
because of their possible influence on other
economic variables and as a source of clues to
understanding the determinants of interest
rates.
One indication of the importance of the
cyclical movements is their amplitude. The
average cyclical rise and fall on twenty-year
governments between October 1949 and Feb-
ruary 1961 was about three-quarters of one
percentage point, representing a price differ-
ence of about 11 poirits. The amplitude of
yields on three-month Treasury bills during
the same period averaged 1.86 percentage
points. The size of the yield changes may be
better grasped if we note that the average peak
yield on longs was 127 per cent of the average
of yields at the preceding and following troughs;
the corresponding figure for bills was 233 per
cent.
Two major characteristics of cyclical fluctu-
ations require special attention—timing and
amplitude. Each shows a wide variety of be-
havior, as we compare different cycles with
one another, and as we compare different
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interest-rate series during the. same cycle. De-
spite this diversity, certain generalizations can
be made. Let us begin with timing. During the
two closing decades of the nineteenth century,
the few series available lagged the business
cycle markedly. Lags on long terms were by
far the greatest, generally exceeding eight
months; but shorts also generally turned after
business with median lags of three to seveil
months. Later, and especially after World War
II, there has been a persistent tendency for
closer and closer synchronization between
cycles in business activity and the movements
of interest rates, both long term and short
term.
At peaks the lag in long rates has not only
diminished but in a slight majority of cases
was replaced by leads after World War II.
As for shorts, Treasury bills have consist-
ently led at peaks since 1923, and even at
troughs they led more often than any other
series did. Call money rate is the only other
short term with a substantial number of leads
at either troughs or peaks. Bank rates on busi-
ness loans have continued to lag.
In a somewhat different analysis of these
data, Cagan shows that with one exception
turning points of interest-rate series are very
much closer to one another in time than to the
business cycle. The one exception is with shorts
at peaks, where all turns come close to being
synchronous with each other and with the
business cycle peak.
The amplitude of cyclical movement on call
money rates and commercial paper rates was
very wide between 1885 and 1913, averaging
between 11 and 31 basis points per month.
The amplitude declined during that period, and
it continued at generally much lower levels
after 1919. In sharp contrast, the amplitude
of movement in long terms was extraordinarily
low in the early period, averaging between 1.5
and 2.1 basis points per month between 1885
and 1913 on the two series available; these
amplitudes were substantiallyhigherafter
World War I than before. Thus, the secular
change in amplitude on longs from the late
nineteenth century to the 1920's was exactly
opposite to the change in amplitude on shorts,and both changes were very marked. Between
the 1920's and the 1950's, however, ampli-
tudes on shorts seem to have risen somewhat,
whereas there was no clear trend in amplitudes
on longs. A similar generalization can be made
regarding therelativesizeof interest-rate
amplitudes as compared with the.amplitudes of
business cycles.
For many of us, the most important reason
for study of the cyclical behavior of interest
rates is to help find the causes of this behavior.
A systematic exploration of these questions
will not be possible in the present project, but
Cagan has opened the door to two varieties of
study that are suggestive both for further re-
search and for possible hypotheses regarding
the determination of interest rates.
There are good reasons to believe that two
of the important elements which may help
explain the cyclical behavior of interest rates
are (1) movements in the rate at which the
money supply changes, and (2) the behavior
of banks with respect to loans and investments.
For each cycle from 1904-08 through
1958-6 1 Cagan superimposed the reference
cycle patterns for commercial paper rates and
those for the percentage change in the money
supply (see Chart IV-4). The inverse con-
formity between the two series isstriking,
especially in view of the fact that many other
elements must influence interest rates. Indeed,
the conformity is marked in every cycle except
the decline following 1929. The causal impli-
cations of this observation are now being
explored.
Cagan compared the cyclical patterns from
1919-21 through 1958-61 on short-term interest
rates, long-term interest rates, bank investments,
bank loans, and a number of other series. As
is well known, bank loans and bank invest-
ments commonly move inversely to each other.
Banks attempt to accommodate their customers
and adjust their portfolios to meet this need
as required. If necessary, and sometimes when
not necessary, banks may borrow from Federal
Reserve Banks instead of selling securities, but
this does not prevent the opposing movements
of loans and investments. The cyclical patterns
reveal the inverse conformity clearly, loans
moving cyclically in agreement with business
expansion and contraction. This means that,
typically, banks throw securities on the market
during the expansion of business. The cyclical
pattern makes plausible the hypothesis that one
of the important factors causing interest rates
on bills and bonds to rise during business
expansions may well be the action of banks,
whereby a changed demand for bank loans is
transmitted directlytothe capital market
through the securities in which banks trade—
primarily Treasury bills but also long-term
government bonds. When the demand for bank
loans increases, the banks' sale of securities
causes their prices to fall and their yields to
rise. At the same time, bank rates on loans
also increase.
Important evidence in support of this thesis
is revealed by study of cases where bank invest-
ments do not move inversely to the business
cycle. Inverse conformity between interest rates
and bank investments remains strong and dis-
tinct in almost cases, as well as when
bank investment behavior conforms inversely
to the business cycle pattern.
5. THE TERM STRUCTURE
OF RATES
Our third pair of projects consists of two
studies of the linkage of markets. The first, On
the term structure of interest rates, is important
partly because itiscentral to any interest
theory, and partly because of its direct rele-
vance for government policy and for portfolio
management. Its relevance for portfolio man-
agement is self-evident. Its relevance for gov-
ernment policy isseen in relation to any
program in which debt management is pro-
posed in order tq influence the level of eco-
nomic activity, or in which monetary policy
is conducted by trading in securities with dif-
ferent term to maturity. An important con-
temporary objective directly involving term
structure has been the desire for
low long rates to encourage business at home,
together with high short rates in order to pre-
33vent the balance of payments consequences of
short-term capital exports.
An analysis of term structure is fundamental
to any of interest rates, because major
contending theories about the term structure
imply entirely different determinants of long-
term rates. Among academic scholars, by far
the most widely accepted explanation of the
term structure of interest rates is based on the
expectations hypothesis or a modified version
of it. Briefly summarized, the unmodified ver-
sion of this theory runs essentially as follows.
If one-year rates are now 1 per cent and if
one-year rates are expected to be 3 per cent
next year, then two-year rates today will have
to be in the neighborhood of their average, 2
per cent. Only such a relationship can equalize
returns for a two-year investment by the two
aVenues available: the purchase of a two-year
security, or investment in a one-year obligation
followed by reinvestment in another. Though
individuals may not all be able to invest for
the full two-year period, speculators will force
the approximate equality.
This example may be generalized by stating
that long rates will tend to be an "average" of
expected short-term rates over the intervening
period. Because of compounding, this is a com-
plex kind of weighted average. It should be
noted from the derivation of our generalization
that it implies expected yields over any given
holding period, including capital gains or losses,
must be equal on all securities, long or short.
If expectations are uniform and held with per-
fect confidence, securities of different term
become perfect substitutes for one another.
One consequence is that under this assumption
a change in the mixture of outstandings be-
tween longs and shorts will not affect the term
structure,unlessitchangesexpectations.
Another implication of this theory is that from
the yield curve at a given time it is possible
to derive the expected future short-term rates
up to the maturity of the longest security on
the yield curve.
Reuben Kessel conducted our major study
of the term structure of interest rates. Kessel's
work consisted chiefly of testing a modified
version of the expectations hypothesis. The
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modification takes account of the view, ex-
pressed by Hicks and others, that investors
are not indifferent to' the risk of holding long-
term securities and hence may demand(or
offer) a premium in the form of higher (or
lower) yields on longs. The risk exists because
the' capital values of longs (in contrast to
shorts) may change in unexpected, drastic
amounts if interest rates change.
Kessel undertook to explore whether such
a modified expectations hypothesis is consistent
with the observed facts and, if so, whether the
risk premium on longs is positive or negative.
His studies support the view that without the
introductkn of positive risk premiums the
expectations hypothesis seems untenable: it is
contradicted by a persistent tendency of yield
curves to slope positively and by other evidence
of implied market predictions that seem too
wide of the mark to persist in the real world.
The introduction of risk premiums provides a
theory in which these objections are greatly
softened, and one which explains much of
observed interest rate phenomena.
Chart 11-5 illustrates the way interest rates
might reflect the combined forces of expecta-
tions and risk premiums. RP is the risk pre-
mium. curve, these premiums rising monotoni-
cally with term to maturity because of the rising
risk of capital loss as term lengthens. Accord-
ing to Kessel's findings, this component of
observed interest rates will always be positively
sloped, but it may grow steeper when interest
rates rise. The r1 and r2 curves represent the
yield curve as it would be under an unmodified
expectations hypothesis, the first when current
short rates are low and expected to rise, and
the other when they are high and expected to
fall. As portrayed, this curve would respond
to changing levels of short rates by taking
positive and negative slopes so that an over-all
composite would show rough symmetry about
a horizontal line drawn at S.
Observed yields would be the sum of the
appropriate RP and r curves. The result of
the configuration in Panel 1 is that a majority
of yield curves are positively sloped, but that
in times when rates are very high relative to
historical standards the dominance of the ex-CHART 11-5
Components of Hypothetical Yield Curves,
Expectations and Risk-Premium Hypotheses Combined
Total yield (R1 and R2)
Expected yield component (r1 and r2)
. Risk premium component (RP)
When short rates are low: R1 = RP + r1
When short rates are high: R2 = RP + r2
pectations component may produce negatively
sloped curves like R2.
Panel 2 represents an alternative possibility.
If the RP curve is much more sharply curved
at an early point and then flattens rapidly,
and if the r2 curve resembles the one shown
here, the combination may well produce a
hump in the intermediate short-term range.
Such curves have been observed at times of
high rates in the post-World War II period.
A composite theory of this kind is consistent
with Kessel's empirical studies. It is supported
by both Meiselman's and Kessel's studies of
the implications of combining the expectations
hypothesis with Meiselman's hypothesis on the
determination of expectations. It is given some
support from Kessel's tests of the forecasting
ability of the market, which looks much more
reasonable when risk premiums are admitted
to the theory. Finally, it is consistent with the
logic of equilibrium relations on which the ex-
pectations hypothesis was initially founded.
A general objection to this logic is raised
by financial practitioners, who rightly point out
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Panel1 Panel 2
0 Term to maturity 0 Term to moturttythat they make no attempt to predict short-
term rates over extended periods into the
future, and who therefore dismiss as nonsense
a theory which says the market makes long rates
equal to an average of such expected short rates.
Expectations theorists would make the follow-
ing rejoinder. It is not required by the theory
that investors consciously think in terms of
present and future short-term rates. It is only
necessary that the market observe when past
movements in the term structure make it ob-
viously absurd to have held one term instead
of another. If the market only attempts to bring
expected holding-period yields into some kind
of conformity, it will be doing what the expec-
tations hypothesis asserts. History makes clear
that holding-period yields on longs and shorts
have varied widely, but it is difficult to believe
that there are not elements in the market
attempting to take advantage of such potential
discrepancies to the extent that their best fore-
casting ability permits. If this is true, then the
expectations hypothesis provides a partial ex-
planation of the term structure.
Admitting risk premiums to the expectations
hypothesis destroys the view that securities of
different term are perfect substitutes and pro-
vides instead the picture of a partly segmented
market. The resulting implication that supply
can alter the term structure .is consistent with
market observations and may make the com-
bined theory more acceptable to financial prac-
titionersthan the unmodified expectations
hypothesis.
At this point, it will be useful to note an
alternate interpretation of admitting risk pre-
miums to the expectations hypothesis. We have
talked of risk premiums as if somehow "true"
interest rates were those on shorts, and addi-
tional payments had to be made to holders of
longs. It would be equally legitimate to assume
that long rates provide a base, and that holders
of shorts earn a "liquidity premium"—a non-
pecuniary return—in addition to their pecuni-
ary return. This terminology has the advantage
of providing an easy bridge to Keynesian liquid-
ity preference theory. Just as Keynes said that
liquidity preference would give an advantage
to cash over bonds (especially in times of low
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rates), so Kessel expands this concept to say
that liquidity preference provides an advantage
to short-term securities over long-term, as a
result of which holders demand a smaller
pecuniary reward for holding shorts. Whereas
we have suggested above that the hypothesis
supported by Kessel's studies is a modified
expectations hypothesis in which risk pre-
miums are admitted, we may now express the
same idea by stating that these studies indicate
the need to marry the liquidity preference
theory to the expectations hypothesis.
6. THE SPREAD BETWEEN NEW
AND SEASONED YIELDS ON
CORPORATES
The second study of linkage in markets is
an examination of the yield difference between
newly issued securities and seasoned issues of
the same character. The size of this spread, as
observed from published series such as those
of Moody, seems to give this question impor-
tance both for investment policy and because
of the problems it presents regarding the effi-
ciency of the capital market. If new and sea-
soned issues are essentially identical it would
seem that any difference between their yields
implies imperfections in the capital market.
Yet accprding to the published record the
spread is great. In June 1957, it equaled 90
basis points according to Moody data. In every
month from April 1956 through December
1957, the investor could have obtained a higher
yield on new Aa's than he could have received
on Seasoned A's, and his average gain by secur-
ing the higher-grade bond would have been
33.5 basis points. Less dramatic but sizable
new-outstanding yield spreads appear to have.
persisted most of the time through 1960. The
purpose of this study was partly to find whether
the yield spread is genuine, and partly to ex-
plain the determinants of any part found to be
real.
Our work is focused chiefly on the first
decade after the Treasury—Federal Reserve
Accord of 1951, whereby the pegging of long-
term government rates was discontinued. The
primary analysis was based on two series:Moody's series of Aa corporates, and a series
of Aa utilities compiled by Sidney Homer of
Salomon Brothers and Hutzler. In each case
we derived regressions in which the dependent
variable was the spread in yield between new
and seasoned issues. The regressions are essen-
tinily similar, including as independent vari-
ables the volume of recently issued securities
and four change-in-yield variables covering
different time periods during the year preced-
ing the date of observation of the yield spread.
The equations for the Moody series include
also, as an independent variable, the difference
between the average coupon of the new and
the seasoned issues. The Homer series is cor-
rected for coupon differences and therefore
does not require such a variable. However, in
the study of this series the bill rate was included
as an independent variable.
In both equations each of the independent
variables had a statistically significant influence
on the yield spread and, together, they ac-
counted for about 87 per cent of the variation
in. the Moody series and for about 92 per cent
in the Homer series.
The most important implication of these
regressions is that a very great deal of the
published new-seasoned yield spread and its
variation is essentially spurious. The apparent
spread results to a large extent from the fact
that published series of new and seasoned
issues are not homogeneous with respect to
coupon. High-coupon issues are less attractive
than otherwise similar low-coupon issues, and
consequently the market demands a higher
yield on them. The most important reason for
the greater attractiveness of low-coupon bonds
is that high-coupon issues are more likely to
be called than others; when they are called,
this requires reinvestment of funds just when
rates are relatively low.
When correction is made in the Moody
series on seasoned issues in order to give yields
of bonds with coupon similar to that of new
issues, the average spread for the decade is
reduced from 23.7 basis points to 13.7 basis
points. The Homer series show even greater
influence of coupon differencesthe level of
spread. The average spread between yields on
new issues and yields on per cent
utilities was 26.5 basis points for the decade,
whereas the average spread where outstandings
are corrected for coupon is only 9.4 basis
points.
Although correction for coupon removes a
significant part of the apparent spread between
yields on new and seasoned issues, we still want
to explain what remains. The following hypoth-
esis was partly developed early in our study
and then tested by the data; in part it grew out
of modifications in our earlier thought, which
the data forced upon us.
There are two major elements in our ex-
planation of new-seasoned yield spreads. In
the first place, since dealers are in the business
of selling securities they wish to make new
offerings attractive enough to sell promptly.
This leads to "sweetening" the yield on new
issues under many circumstances, especially
when there is reason to fear that failure to clear
shelves promptly may bring losses through fall-
ing security prices. One part of the explanation
of yield spreads, then, should be found in an
examination of the conditions that might lead
dealers to want to encourage rapid security
sales.
A second element is suggested by the ques-
tion: Why does the market ever let a spread
of this kind develop? So long as new issues are
available, why would anybody buy an equiva-
lent seasoned issue at a price that provides a
lower yield? Put otherwise, why is the market
price of outstandings not forced down to match
yields available on new offerings?
With respect to the first of these elements
(sweetening by dealers) it seems reasonable
that rising yields in the immediate past might
encourage the fear of further decline in security
prices. Observation of the data strongly sup-
ports this hypothesis and, indeed, indicates that
the direction of yield movements over a fairly
extended past period also influences expecta-
tions. Experimentation resulted in the intro-
duction of the four change-in-yield variables
referred to above.
A second consideration which might be ex-
pected to influence the amount of sweetening
expected from dealers is the volume of new
37issues thrown on the market in the immediate
past and current periods. The most influential
feasible variable we found for volume was the
two-month volume of all new cbrporate issues,
including direct placements and equities.
Tightness of the money market, as indicated
by the Treasury bill rate, appears to be a sig-
nificant explanatory variable. Because of very
high correlation with coupon difference be-
tween new and seasoned issues, this variable
does not appear in the Moody equation, but it
is statistically significant in the Homer equa-
tion. Two closely related reasons for this rela-
tion suggest themselves. One is that dealers
may be concerned about financing their posi-
tion in new securities when the money market
is tight. A similar reason is that the cost of
carry will be higher (or the gain on the carry
less) under these conditions..
In all these respects our armchair hypothe-
sis received confirmation from statistical tests.
We turn now to the second type of considera-
tion that might cause yield spreads to exist.
These spreads depend, we have indicated, upon
the failure of the market yields on seasoned
issues to move up rapidly to whatever yields
are provided on new securities. We have sought
without success for variables that might logi-
cally be expected to influence the degree of
friction in the market, and that test out success-
fully with the data. But the extraordinarily
great influence of one variable already included
may be attributable in part to the presence of
such a lag. If the various influences that deter-
mine interest rates operate directly on the new
issue market, then new issue rates should re-
spond promptly to such forces. If there is
sluggishness in the market for seasoned issues,
then a spread should be created when rates
generally rise, and the spread should be much
greater when rates rise rapidly. This has been
shown to be so. The change in yield from the
preceding month is by all odds the most power-
ful and the most significant variable in all the
equations we have run (assuming securities
homogeneous with respect to coupon). It is
entirely possible that this variable performs
double duty, influencing the sweetening by
dealers, and reflecting the influence of lags in
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seasoned yields on the yield spread.
The preceding paragraph raises some im-
portant issues regarding the way the securities
markets behave: Do the forces that determine
interest rates operate primarily and directly
on new issue rates, to which seasoned issues
respond with a lag? Or can we think of the
market for seasoned issues as the major market,
where the determinants of interest rates operate
directly, and then add that new issue yields
will reflect these rates subject to the modifica-
tion imposed by dealer desires to sweeten
yields? We conducted a study of leads and
lags which led us to the following conclusions:
Market forces operate directly on the yields
of both new and seasoned issues, though cer-
tainly more rapidly and probably more strongly
on the former. Movements in new issue yields
are a compromise between forces in the market
for money and credit and forces leading to
different degrees of sweetening by dealers.
Movements in seasoned yields are a similar
compromise between forces emanating from
the market for money and credit and forces
tending to eliminate the yield spread between
new and outstanding issues.
One of the important questions of our entire
interest-rate project is to discover how perfect
are the markets for money and credit. The
finding of this study is that the market is much
more nearly perfect than would appear from
observation of yield spreads uncorrected for
coupon. Furthermore, the imperfection that
remains after coupon correction is eliminated
fairly soon. Our studies show that the yield
spread between a new issue and similar out-
standings tends to disappear within about three
months from date of issue.
One final observation suggests general sup-
port for the kind of explanation of yield spreads
given here. Data have been plotted for the
period 1920-40, and spreads for those years
follow a similar pattern. They were usually
positive, especially in times of rising rates. But
they fell to low or even negative values at the
end of periods of sustained declines in interest
rates.
7.FUTURESTUDY
Further research on interest rates is clearly inorder. Major contenders for study, in my view,
include the following.
1. The mortgage market. With the aid of
data collected by Guttentag and Beck it should
be possible to learn more about the relation-
ship between interest rates and other dimen-
sions of credit availability. Also much remains
to be learned about geographic differentials in
interest rates on mortgages, both interregional
and intraregional. The nonresidential mortgage
market provides a third important area now
largely unexplored, and one that may shed new
light on the effects of interest rates on the level
and nature of economic activity.
2. The term structure of rates. We should
test other hypotheses besides those examined
by Kessel for the present project, compare the
outcomes, and attempt to demonstrate either
the superiority of one theory over others or to
construct an eclectic theory which draws upon
valid elements of several approaches.
3. Cyclical movements. Following Cagan's
work on the nature of cyclical movements in
interest-rate series, we should examine cyclical
movements of related series and discover what
clues are suggested regarding the determina-
tion of interest rates. These hypotheses should
then be tested by various empirical techniques.
4. Effects of interest rates. There is a grow-
ing conviction that research has gone far
enough now to justify further intensive work
on the effects of interest rates on economic
activity, in contrast to the focus of our present
study, which has been to find the determinants
of interest rates and their movements; At vari-
ous institutions, a number of such studies have
been recently completed or are in process, but
there is room for much further work on this
knotty problem.
Many other topics than those listed above
should be considered. Further work on direct
placements could include default experience
and the relation between commitments and
take-downs. The relations between interest
rates and return on equities present a difficult
group of problems on which some economists
are already at work, but further explorations
here might be feasible. The role of interest
rates in international economic relations, in-
cluding especially capital movements, requires
more extensive empirical examination than has
yet been carried on. A description and explana-
tion of secular movements in interest rates
would be an important candidate for further
study. Consideration might also be given to an
investigation concentrating on the influence on
interest rates and the capital market generally
of new instruments, institutions, and knowledge
developed in the period since World War II.
JOSEPH W. CONARD
THE NATIONAL BUREAU'S STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Developments during the past several years
demonstrate the relevance of our basic research
to contemporary international economic prob-
lems. Consider first the relation between busi-
ness cycles and foreign trade. Ever since it
became clear several years ago that this country
faced a balance-of-payments problem of seri-
ous dimensions, we have had the problem of
judging how much of the deterioration—or
at times how much of the improvement—in
our position was due to cyclical or other short-
run influences and how much to more funda-
39mental factors. Some failed to make this
distinction tended to regard a bad situation
as hopeless in early 1959 when our imports
were moving up swiftly and our exports, after
a steep fall from the 1957 peak, were still
pointing down.
Contrariwise, the subsequent sharp recovery
of our exports and of our exporf surplus pro-
duced exaggerated hopes, if allowance was
not made for the temporary influence of the
1960-6 1 recession in curtailing our imports.
Then, as we moved out of that recession, the
opposite effect was produced once more as our
imports rose by ii per cent in 1962 while
our exports, chiefly because of business con-
ditions in Japan and the United Kingdom, rose
by less than 3 per cent. It is one of the encour-
agingaspectsof our balance-of-payments
development last year that, with domestic
business expansion continuing, our imports
rose by only about 5 per cent while our exports
moved up by 7 (Table 11-4).
Clearly, therefore, any attempt to appraise
trends in our foreign trade and their meaning
for the balance of payments must take due
account of cyclical, influences at home and
abroad. Thanks to Ilse Mintz's research, we
should be better able to understand the nature
and timing of these influences and to make
appropriate allowance for them. In her work
on the behavior of U.S. exports during business
cycles she noted, for instance, that the latter
part of our export decline from 1957 to 1959
had come during a period of "counterexpan-
sion"—that is, business activity had turned up
in the United States after the second quarter
of 1958 but was still declining abroad. She
further reported: "Our analysis discloses that
U.S. exports have invariably declined during
counterexpansions. The latest drop was one
of the two mildest among six periods of this
type."
Mintz's note in Part IV of the present report
will be helpful in judging the likely effects of
the current business expansion on our foreign
trade. If the expansion in domestic activity
lAmerican Exports During Business Cycles, 1879-
1958, Occasional Paper 76, NBER 1961, p. 5.
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continues, imports wifi doubtless also continue
to rise, probably at a faster rate than last year.
But foreign demand affecting our exports also
seems to be growing strongly. Herein may in-
deed lie the chief threat of the moment to the
smooth development of our international trade
and payments. In some countries expansion
has taken on an inflationary character such
as to require them to take countermeasures
in the interest of price stability and the balance
of payments. It remains to see whether they
can execute this sometimes delicate operation
without provoking a downturn in economic
activity and without resort to measures directly
aimed at curtailing imports.
Beyond these cyclical aspects, there is need
to develop a better understanding of the forces
affecting our international competitive position
over the longer run. It is common knowledge
that the share of world exports of manufactures
supplied by the United States has shrunk from
26 per cent in 1953 to about 20 per cent last
year. It is also well known that, in some key
products, our prices have risen a good deal
more than those of our leading competitors,
or at least that they apparently did so until
around In that year, the machinery and
motive products component of our wholesale
price index was 24 per cent higher than in
1953, and the metals and metal products com-
ponent was 21 per cent higher. Other leading
countries reported much smaller rates of in-
crease for these groups. It is logical to suppose
that the fall in our share of the export market
for manufactures is related to the increase in
our prices compared with those of other coun-
tries. More empirical research is needed, how-
ever, before we can judge the breadth and
force of this influence on our international
competitive position.
A major difficulty in this regard is that the
information available for making price com-
parisons is so deficIent in quantity and quality.
This problem is given some attention in my
volume, Problems of the United States as World
Trader and Banker,2 published a year ago. As
observed there, one may particularly question
2Pp. 56-68.TABLE 11-4






Exports Imports Exports Imports
' 1956 17,379 12,804 +21.7 +11.1
1957 19,390 13,291 +11.6 + 3.8
1958 16,264 12,952 — 16.1 —2.6
1959 16,282 15,310 +.1 +18.2
1960 19,459 14,723 +19.5 —3.8
1961 19,915 14,514 + 2.3 —1.4
1962 20,479 16,145 + 2.8 +11.2
1963 21,902 16,962 + 7.0 + 5.1
NOTE: The figures are given as adjusted for balance of payments purposes in the
sources indicated.
SouRcE: Balance of Payments, Statistical Supplement (revised ed.), Supplement to
Survey of Current Business, 1963, pp. 3-4; Survey of Current Business, March 1964, page 16.
the reliance frequently placed on so-called
"unit value" indexes of exports and imports.
By their nature, these indexes tend to be most
inadequate in their coverage of advanced man-
ufactures—that is, the very products in which
we are most interested for purposes of con-
sidering changes in competitive positions.
In this connection, Robert Marjolin, a vice-
president of the European Economic Commis-
sion, in a recent address largely devoted to
inflationary tendencies in the Common Mar-
ket, limited his international comparisons to
consumer prices and wage costs per unit of
output.3 The figures he cited are interesting
enough to bear repetition.









These figures, in contrast with the relative
stability observed for the United States over
the same period, led Marjolin to formulate a
stem warning over the deterioration in the
international competitive position of the Com-
mon Market countries. At the same time, use
of these data is a reminder of how far we are
from being able to generalize 'about relative
prices, and changes in relative prices, of goods
actually moving in international trade.
We expect to know more about the problems
and the possibilities of making such inter-
national price comparisons as the result of the
study now being conducted by Kravis, Lipsey,
and Bourque. Their study covers a particularly
difficultarea (machinery and other metal
products) and should be of value not only in
providing new price information but also in
developing methodology and in providing in-









3Address given on Jan. 21, 1964, to the European
Parliament in Strasbourg, "The Economic Situation
of the European Economic Community in 1963 and
the Outlook for 1964."
41on trade flows. The information needed for
this study is being obtained directly from busi-
ness and government organizations operating
internationally. It reflects the experience of
these organizations as sellers and, more fre-
quently, as buyers. The investigators expect
that, with the excellent cooperation they are
receiving, they will be able to make both com-
prehensive and detailed place-to-place price
comparisons that have never been possible
before. They expect also to be able to con-
struct more comparable and more relevant
indexes of price changes through time than
are now available. Finally, they hope to develop
information on nonprice factors to aid in evalu-
ating the influence of prices on trade.
Another empirical study focused on this
country's international competitive position is
Georgiadis' work on the performance of the
United States in international trade. The basic
purpose here is to go beyond the generaliza-
tions that can readily be made about the
decline in the over-all share of the United States
in world exports of manufactures and to see
more specifically in what products and in what
countries this decline has occurred and how
the United States has fared in other areas of
competition. It is hoped that his analysis will
provide useful clues to the nature of the causal
influences at work—e.g., whether they are gen-
eral and pervasive or specific to certain prod-
ucts and markets.
Much of the detailed information on trade,
production, and other variables needed for
this study has been assembled and processed,
and the analysis will soon begin to take shape.
Meanwhile, the selection of data given in Table
IV-17 of Georgiadis' report in Part IV pro-
vides food for thought. It will be seen that the
U.S. loss in export market shares for manu-
factures from 1953-55 to 1960-61 was largely
accounted for by Canada. This was the result
of, first, a sharp relative decline in Canada's
total imports of virtually all items compared
with the imports of other leading foreign coun-
tries and, second, some loss in the share of
Canada's imports supplied by the United
States. A contrary development may be seen
in Germany and some other countries with the
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notable exception of their imports of automo-
biles and steel. The stronger performance of
our exports to overseas markets was, however,
far from sufficient to offset the adverse devel-
opments in our major Canadian market.
Georgiadis tentatively suggests that there
may be a connection between the large size of
our share in the Canadian market for most
manufactures and the general tendency for that
share to decline and, similarly, a connection
between the much smaller size of our shares
in most other countries and the fairly wide-
spread tendency for those shares to rise. How-
ever that may be, even his preliminary results
do suggest the need to consider not only price
changes but also other factors influencing our
share of world markets.
Another illustration of the qualifications I
have in mind concerning the role of price
changes is given by my brief note in Part IV
concerning the Occasional Paper in preparation
on imports of manufactures by the United
States and Western Europe from less developed
countries and Japan. A point of major interest
is the great contrast between the United States
and Continental Western Europe (the United
Kingdom falling somewhere between in terms
of these comparisons). Taking labor-oriented
manufactures other than food, we find that
United States imports in 1962 from less devel-
oped countries and Japan totaled close to $1.7
billion, or more than three times as much as
Western Continental Europe imported from
these sources. In our case, these imports made
up about 30 per cent of our total imports of
the products in question in 1962. For most
European countries other than the United
Kingdom, the corresponding percentage was
only some 1.5 to 3 per cent, with a high of
4.5 per cent for West Germany and a low of
1.2 per cent for Austria.
It is possible that these striking differences
are attributable to relative price changes dur-
ing the period. This would mean that the rise
in costs and prices was great enough in the
United States, but not in Continental Europe,
to provide large market opportunities for im-
ports of manufactures from the less developed
countries and from Japan. I suspect, however,that basic cost relations were already favorable
to the development of this trade with the United
States, and that the important new factor has
been the imaginative and energetic organiza-
tion of production, frequently at the initiative
of, or in close collaboration with, American
importers. I suspect also that, in Continental
European countries, it is not so much smaller
price differences as greater import impediments
of one kind or another that explain the failure
of their imports from the less developed coun-
tries and Japan to become more important.
These impediments include not only tariffs and
quotas at the official level but also restrictive
business practices and attitudes. If such im-
ports had developed, they would have helped
to relieve inflationary pressures in European
countries both by the direct effect on prices
and by the release of scarce manpower to more
productive employment. They would have con-
tributed, at the same time, to economic growth
in some of the less privileged parts of the
world.
The importance of being able to examine
not only merchandise trade but also other
international-payments relations in their re-
gional aspects is stressed in Herbert B. Wool-
ley's study, "Measuring Transactions Between
World Areas," which we expect to send to
press soon. His regionally elaborated balance-
of-payments statistics for 1950-54 will help
other economists to form a judgment as to
the utility of this kind of information and also
as to the feasibility of regularly preparing such
a record by integrating, reconciling, and sup-
plementing the separate balance-of-payments
estimatesofindividualcountries.Walther
Michael's more detailed work on statistics of
international capital movements between major
world areas will also help in weighing the use-
fulness and the practicability of compiling such
information.
In regard to this question it would seem
that, in principle, our interest in geographic
detail should not stop with merchandise trade
but should extend to all items in the balance
of payments, if we are to have a more adequate
statistical basis for analyzing international eco-
nomic and financial relations. These relations
seem likely to concern us more in the future
than in past years, to judge from our recent
experience and current preoccupations.
Let me illustrate by reference to the regional
balance-of-payments data for the United States
cited by Woolley in his last chapter. On the
basis of these figures, he notes that this -coun-
try's direct bilateral balance on recorded trans-
actions of all kinds with Western Europe
shifted from a deficit of $1.2 billion in 19 50-54
to a surplus of $900 million in 196 1-62 (annual
averages). Despite this shift, Western Europe
continued to acquire gold and liquid dollar
funds from the United States at an annual
rate of more than $1 billion. At the same time,
the United States has been making net pay-
ments on recorded transactions with non-
European countries far greater than can be
accounted for by their acquisitions of gold and
liquid dollars from us. We are thus able to
conclude, on the basis of United States data.
alone, that there must have developed in recent
years large net transfers of dollars to Western
Europe from other areas. But we cannot ex-
plain the origins or nature of these dollar trans-
fers in the existing state of knowledge about
internationaltransactionsbetweenforeign
areas. It is impossible to say, for instance, to
what extent the transfers are due to increases
in payments by third countries to Western
Europe for goods and services or to increases
in capital movements or, if the latter, how
much arises from debt repayment and how
much from the flight of capital from Latin
America, the Far East, and other areas. I
need belabor the importance of such
information for the correct appraisal of prob-
lems and the development of appropriate
policies.
This experience suggests a need for the kind
of regional payments accounts developed by
Wôolley, though views will, differ on the best
way of consolidating the data by areas and
by types of transactions and on other methodo-
logical points. Views will also differ concerning
the practicability of preparing such regional
accounts as a recurrent statistical operation.
For one thing, even if organized on a regular
basis, the preparation of such information is
43to be costly in terms of skilled manpower
required, and the results could be available only
with a delay determined by the most laggard
among the reporting countries. Another diffi-
culty is that, at best, the consolidated estimates
will still be subject to the famous "errors and
omissions" which beset national balance-of-
payments statisticians. For this reason, and
perhaps also on conceptual grounds, there may
be questions concerning the significance of
Woolley's residual calculation of net multi-
lateral settlements.
It may be that these or other problems will
be considered too serious to permit the sys-
tematicelaborationof payments accounts
between major areas in the manner attempted
by Woolley. If so, we hope the difficulties will,
by the same token, increase interest in the
short-cut methods with he has experi-
mented for computing goods and services
transactions, both net and gross, in regional
detail. Subject to further experimentation and
testing, we have here a methodology which
could, with a minimum of cost and time, add
to the flow of current information on inter-
national trade and payments relations. Though
limited to goods and services, this information
would be an advance over what we now have
and would furnish a basis to which efforts being
made elsewhere to improve information on
international capital flows could be related.
Woolley's work will, we believe, help others
to decide whether continuing work should be
organized along either the broader or the
narrower lines which he has explored. The
National Bureau does not, of course, under-
take such recurrent statistical operations, and
the publication of Woolley's results and, sub-
seqtiently, of Michael's supporting study will
conclude this investigation. Several exploratory
investigations of other topics are under way.
Some of these may be developed into full-
fledged research projects.. The summary analy-
sis of imports of manufactures from the less
developed countries and Japan, to which I have
already referred, will be developed into a short
occasional paper. It should cast light into some
dark corners and also enable us to decide
whether to undertake further work on the ob-
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stacles to this trade and its potentialities.
Another tOpic we are considering is the
relation between technology and international
trade. It has often been suggested that a reduc-
tion of our technological lead over other coun-
tries has contributed importantly to our inter-
national payments difficulties of recent years.
We should like to subject this hypothesis to
empirical test. It is, however, an area in which
facts are particularly elusive, and it remains
to be seen if a promising approach can be
developed.
Still another subject for investigation con-
the causal forces determining interna-
tional capital movements—a subject of great
topical interest, because of the sharp differ-
ences of views which have developed about it
and because of its bearing on monetary policy.
The rise in the rate of U.S. private investment
abroad has been an outstanding feature of our
balance of payments during the past decade.
In the first half of the 1950's that flow, includ-
ing both short-term and long-term U.S. private
capital net of repayments, averaged just over
$1 billion annually. It then rose to more than
$3 billion in 1956 and remained generally
within the range of $3 to $4 billion through
1962. In the first half of 1963 these invest-
ments, especially in the form of new foreign
security flotations, seemed to take another big
jump, rising from $900 million in the first
quarter (seasonally adjusted) to over $1.7
billion in the second—i.e., to an annual rate
of close to $7 billion. Therewith, the balance-
of-payments deficit for the second quarter
moved up abruptly to a rate of more than $5
billion. The quarterly estimates frequently
show wide variations, of course, and there
were some distinctly temporary elements in
the second quarter, especially in Canadian
borrowings. But, according to the United
States authorities, there was also clear indica-
tion of further increases in European security
flotations in this market.
To deal with this difficulty, the Administra-
tion proposed, it will be recalled, an interest-
equalization tax which, though not yet passed
by Congress, seems to have had the effect of
greatly reducing the flow of U.S. capital intoforeign securities since the middle of last year.
Some think, indeed, that the measure is more
effective While still pending, and while the legal
situation is not yet clear, than it will be when
and if enacted.
If. the Administration's proposal becomes
law, its effects will be studied for any light they
may cast on the relation between interest rates
and international capital flows. The proposal
itself implies a view that relative rates of inter-
est—or relative rates of net return on capital
in any form—are important in this regard and
hence that, if capital outflows are not to become
excessive, rates here need to be kept at an
appropriate adjustment to rates in other finan-
cial. centers. This view has been questioned on
The distinction between the short run and the
long run is not new to economists, but it may
be well to remind ourselves and others of it
occasionally. Particularly is it necessary when
the daily economic news deals almost exclu-
sively with the very short run. Current statis-
tics reported in the press compare last week's
retail sales with that of the week before or with
the same week a year ago. Industrial produc-
tion is headlined as advancing if the latest
month's figure exceeds the previous month's.
Not only do the figures pertain to very short
intervals of time—which they must do if they
are to be "current" and therefore newsworthy
—but the comparisons also generally relate to
rather short spans, a week, a month, or a year.
For the purpose of analyzing business cycles
historically and keeping one's appraisal of the
business cycle up to date, short time units and
short time spans are essential. Such appraisals
the ground that little correlation can be found
in the available data on interest rates and capi-
tal flows. These data relate in the main to
rather recent United States experience, and
they need to be supplemented in various ways
and, in any case, studied more carefully. It
may not be possible to reach firm conclusions
even when that is done, but the questions
involved—the magnitude, fluctuations, direc-
tion, and determinants of international capital
flows, and the policies to deal with them—are
surely among the most important for study in
relation to both national and international
financial policy.
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are crucial for many decisions. The four busi-
ness recessions in the United States since World
War II each lasted about a year, or less. Inven-
tories accumulated at the peak of the cycle
may prove seriously burdensome during the
ensuing twelve months. Prompt and accurate
appraisal of short-run shifts in demand may
make the difference between success and fail-
ure in buying materials, scheduling production,
operating on overtime, raising working capital,
and so on. Similarly, on the level of national
economic policy there are numerous decisions
and actions of a temporary, reversible sort that
require a minimum of lag between the record-
ing of an event and the reaction to it. While
promptly available quarterly data will some-
times suffice for this purpose, monthly data
are usually necessary and, at critical junctures
of the business cycle, weekly data can be help-
ful. It would be unthinkable to base monetary
45
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Ipolicy, for example, on monetary statistics that
become available only once a year, say, and
referred to the year as a whole.
On the other hand, there are decisions of
a longer-run and more nearly irreversible kind
that require a different view of the past and
the future. A commitment to build a new plant,
to erect an office building or apartment house,
or to float a bond issue depends heavily upon
an appraisal of prospects for growth. Decisions
of this type must be justified in terms of the
long-run developments in demand, competitive
position, and profits that will either affect or
be affected by them. The short-run outlook is
relevant, however, to the timing of such deci-
sions. The bond market may be temporarily
unfavorable, or cost conditions may dictate
postponement of a modernization project. For
small business firms, appropriate timing may
make the difference between a profitable out-
come and bankruptcy. Yet even in small firms
the pros and cons of major investment deci-
sions must be weighed in terms of long-run
prospects.
II
All of us tend to become specialists, and
to emphasize our specialties. I should like to
illustrate, with some simple charts, how some
of our business cycle indicators can be viewed
in a longer-run perspective. The function of
these series that has been emphasized in our
studies of indicators is to throw light on short-
run, cyclical developments in the economy.
But the same materials can be used in other
ways, and for some purposes it is important
to do so, as already noted.
The first set of charts, 11-6 to 11-10, illus-
trates the effect of lengthening the time unit
in which the data are expressed. In quarterly
data (Chart 11-6), and even more in monthly
data (not shown), the business cycle is plainly
evident. The mild recessions during the middle
twenties and since World War II, the severe
though brief contractions of 1920-2 1and
1937-38, and the prolonged contraction and
recovery of 1929-37—all this varied cyclical
experience during the past four and a half
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decades is traced out faithfully in the quarterly
record. When the quarters are consolidated
into years (Chart 11-7), the cyclical picture
is blurred but not suppressed. In terms of gross
national product the mild recessions often
appear simply as a retardation or cessation of
growth in the annual data. Industrial produc-
tion, nonf arm employment, and unemployment
are more sensitive. Here, even the mild reces-
sions are marked by declines in production
and employment and by increases in the unem-
ployment rate.
When the view encompasses three years at
a time, or five years, or ten years, however,
the business cycle virtually disappears (Charts
11-8, 11-9, 11-10). Only the Great Depression,
which affected the economy for a decade,
remains. Every other recession is wiped out
(with the exception, in the three-year figures
alone, of the 1945-46 reconversion period).
What remains in the charts is a representation
of the long-run growth in the nation's output,
the upward sweep in the number of persons
employed in producing that output, the rela-
tively steady proportion of the labor force that
is unemployed, and the great deflation of prices
in the twenties and thirties and the subsequent
inflation.
It should not be supposed, of course, that
this means that those whose policies or deci-
sions depend upon the prospects for growth
or inflation can ignOre the business cycle.
The business cycle, as I remarked above, may
be a critical factor in the timing of such policies
or decisions. Furthermore, no one can offer
an absolute guarantee that a severe depression,
with effects lasting several years, will not occur
again, although much has been done to reduce
the probability of such an occurrence. Federal
insurance of bank deposits has reduced this
probability, as the monetary studies by Friend-
man, Schwartz, and Cagan have shown. Un-
employment insurance has reduced the prob-
ability, as Creamer's study of personal incomes
showed some years ago and as Philip Klein's
recent work has confirmed. Federal mortgage
loan guarantee and insurance has reduced it,
as the investigation by Saulnier, Jacoby, and
Haicrow indicated. The regulation of securitiesCHART 11-6
Business Cycles in Perspective, Quarterly Data
Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
















0 '55 '60CHART 11-7
Business Cycles in Perspective, Annual Data
Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
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Business Cycles in Perspective, Three-Year Averages (centered)
Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.





























Business Cycles in Perspective, Five-Year Averages (centered)
Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.




















Business Cycles in Perspective, Ten-Year Averages (centered)
Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
All series are plotted on ratio scale except unemployment rate.
5'land commodities markets, insurance of savings
and loan accounts, farm price supports, the
graduated income tax, and a host of other
developments have tended to reduce the chance
of severe depression. The general appraisal
which Arthur Burns offered a few years ago
indicated that this country had definitely made
progress toward economic stability, as he put it.1
Government policy, though, remains in the
hands of men. Their policy goals may conffict,
they may not be able to determine what action
will produce the desired effect, and action itself
may be long delayed. Consider the history of
the recently enacted tax cut legislation. Tax
reduction conflicted with tax reform and with
the goal of a balanced budget; the nation's
ability to produce without the tax cut in 1963
proved stronger than it had been estimated to
be with the tax cut; and action recommended
in January 1963 (indeed, considered seriously
in the summer of 1962) was taken only in
March 1964.
Since 1938, we have enjoyed the longest
period in our history without a severe business
contraction. This encouraging record is owing
in no small part to the structural changes noted
above. But the experience does not make cer-
tain that we have the means to prevent the
occurrence of a speculative boom, or that we
could prevent its collapse with the attendant
repercussions on confidence. Itis no more
than prudent, therefore, to keep an eye on the
business cycle, even when one's primary con-
cern is with the long pull. The important thing
is to avoid becoming so concerned with every
wiggle in the curve that the perspective of the
longer drift is lost.
'U
The second set of charts, 11-11 and 11-12,
makes the same point as the first set but in a
different way. Here the time unit in which the
data are recorded remains the same, but the
1American Economic Review, March 1960.
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rates of change in the data are computed over
longer and longer spans.
Chart 11-11 shows annual rates of change
in the monthly index of industrial production,
first from one month to the next, then over
spans of 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months.
The bottom line is the familiar comparison
of the current month with the same month a
year ago. What the chart demonstrates is that
over short spans of a month or so there are
great irregularities, even in an index as broadly
based as the production index. Then, as the
span increases, the business cycle emerges more
clearly.
Chart 11-12 takes this procedure a step
further, using annual data on gross national
product. Year-to-year rates of change are
shown at the top, then rates of change over
spans of 2, 3, 5, and 10 years. Since all the
rates are expressed as annual rates, they all
run at about the same average level, roughly
3 or 4 per cent per year. But the variation
around that level is very, different, diminishing
sharply as the span increases. Rates of growth
over 5-or 10-year spans remain relatively steady
for many years at a stretch; over shorter spans
they are far more variable. The short-span
rates are, of course, importantly affected by
the business cycle; the long-span rates are
dominated by growth.
Thus we see that the span over which change
is measured may be too short to reveal the
business cycle clearly, and that spans long
enough to accomplish it may be too short to
disclose growth trends. An appropriate choice
of span is therefore essential, for the choice
can vitally affect the results. If growth is the
problem, spans must be long enough to bridge
the business cycle.
'V
The charts illustrate two ways in which the
growth trends in "business cycle indicators"
can be revealed: first, by enlarging the time
unit in which the data are expressed, and next,
by increasing the span over which change is
measured. There are, of course, other ways toCHART Il-il
Industrial Production,
Percentage Rates of Change per Year Based on Monthly Data, 1947-63
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Gross National Product in Constant (1954) Dollars,
Percentage Rates of Change per Year Based on Annual Data











Per centaccomplish thisresult. Mathematical trend
lines can be fitted, data can be averaged over
the period covered by each successive business
cycle, rates of change can be calculated from
the peak of one cycle to the peak of the next,
or the effects of cyclical fluctuations in the
utilization of resources can be eliminated by
regression procedures. These various tech-
niques have different merits and deficiencies.
But my illustrations are sufficient, I think, to
call attention to the importance of keeping
long-run trends in view, and to demonstrate
some simple ways of doing so.
The trends revealed are important in their
own right, and they are important for their
effects on the nature of business cycles. They
depict a type of economic movement which
•persists over periods much longer than most
business cycles, and they indicate that business
cycles, too, are subject to persistent changes.
I need not elaborate. Many of the National
Bureau's studies reviewed in this year's report
are making interesting contributions to an
understanding of these trends. For example,
the new study of the service industries is turn-
ing our attention to a seëtor that has both more
growth potential and less cyclical instability
than most. The study of consumer finance is
revealing some little-known facts about another
"growth industry," one that has been altering
the nature of capital formation in this country
by putting a larger share of it into the hands
of the consumer, with far-reaching effects. The
study of labor force trends is developing infor-
mation on the factors that make for long-run
shifts in the size and character of the working
population, dimensions basic to any analysis
of the nation's capacity to maintain full em-
ployment. These are but a few of the investi-
gations that, while focusing on trends, have a
bearing on business cycles. In addition, a num-
ber of studies reported en below are concerned
directly with business cycle phenomena. With
the aid of all these investigations, we shall be
better equipped to keep business cycles in
perspective.
GEOFFREY H. MOORE
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